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Abstract:	Whole-economy	scenarios	for	 limiting	global	warming	to	1.5°C	suggest	that	direct	carbon	
emissions	in	the	buildings	sector	should	decrease	to	almost	zero	by	2050,	but	leave	unanswered	the	
question	how	this	could	be	achieved	by	real-world	policies.	We	take	a	modelling-based	approach	for	
simulating	which	 policy	measures	 could	 induce	 an	 almost-complete	 decarbonisation	 of	 residential	
heating,	the	by	far	largest	source	of	direct	emissions	in	residential	buildings.	Under	which	assumptions	
is	it	possible,	and	how	long	would	it	take?	Policy	effectiveness	highly	depends	on	behavioural	decision-
making	by	households,	especially	in	a	context	of	deep	decarbonisation	and	rapid	transformation.	We	
therefore	 use	 the	 non-equilibrium	 bottom-up	model	 FTT:Heat	 to	 simulate	 policies	 for	 a	 transition	
towards	low-carbon	heating	in	a	context	of	inertia	and	bounded	rationality,	focusing	on	the	uptake	of	
heating	technologies.	Results	indicate	that	the	near-zero	decarbonisation	is	achievable	by	2050,	but	
requires	 substantial	 policy	 efforts.	 Policy	mixes	 are	 projected	 to	 be	more	 effective	 and	 robust	 for	
driving	the	market	of	efficient	low-carbon	technologies,	compared	to	the	reliance	on	a	carbon	tax	as	
the	 only	 policy	 instrument.	 In	 combination	 with	 subsidies	 for	 renewables,	 near-complete	
decarbonisation	could	be	achieved	with	a	residential	carbon	tax	of	50-200€/tCO2.	The	policy-induced	
technology	transition	would	 increase	average	heating	costs	 faced	by	households	 initially,	but	could	
also	lead	to	cost	reductions	in	most	world	regions	in	the	medium	term.	Model	projections	illustrate	
the	uncertainty	that	is	attached	to	household	behaviour	for	prematurely	replacing	heating	systems.	
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1 Introduction	
Final	energy	demand	in	residential	buildings	was	estimated	to	be	24PWh/y	in	2010,	causing	direct	on-
site	emissions	of	2,18GtCO2/y	and	indirect	emissions	from	electricity	use	of	3,5GtCO2/y	(Lucon	et	al.,	
2014).	At	the	same	time,	plenty	of	unexploited	mitigation	options	exist	in	buildings,	many	at	low	(or	
even	negative1)	cost	(Ürge-Vorsatz	et	al.,	2012a).	For	limiting	global	warming	to	2°C,	all	transformation	
pathways	 reviewed	 in	 IPCC-AR5	 therefore	 suggest	 substantial	 reductions	 of	 the	 buildings	 sector’s	
direct	 carbon	emissions:	 around	50-75%	until	 2050,	 and	up	 to	 100%	by	2100	 (Clarke	 et	 al.,	 2014).	
Limiting	 global	 warming	 to	 1.5°C	 implies	 a	 lower	 remaining	 budget	 for	 cumulative	 economy-wide	
emissions	(730-880GtCO2	from	2015-2100,	Millar	et	al.,	2017),	and	therefore	requires	to	reach	net-
zero	carbon	emissions	as	early	as	mid-century	(Rogelj	et	al.,	2015).	Because	remaining	decarbonisation	
options	compared	to	2°C	pathways	are	limited,	scenarios	for	reaching	the	1.5°C	target	rely	much	more	
strongly	on	rapid	emission	reductions	in	the	buildings	sector:	around	85-95%	by	2050,	relative	to	their	
current	level	(Rogelj	et	al.,	2015).	While	such	pathways	indicate	what	may	be	optimal	from	a	social	
planning	perspective,	they	strongly	focus	on	the	supply	side	of	the	energy	system,	leaving	open	the	
question	how	such	a	deep	decarbonisation	could	be	achieved	by	real-world	demand-side	policies,	and	
which	timescale	would	be	realistic.		
It	is	estimated	that	56%	of	final	energy	in	residential	building	is	used	for	space	and	water	heating,	of	
which	55%	 is	generated	by	 fossil	 fuels,	around	30%	by	biomass,	and	15%	by	electricity	and	district	
heating	 systems	 (IEA,	2013a).	Heating	 is	 thus	by	 far	 the	 largest	energy	end-use	 in	households,	and	
responsible	for	most	of	residential	on-site	CO2	emissions.	Despite	that,	it	only	receives	relatively	limited	
policy	attention	compared	to	the	electricity	and	transport	sectors	(IEA,	2014).	While	the	theoretical	
emission	reduction	potential	is	well-known	(Ürge-Vorsatz	et	al.,	2012b),	it	remains	unclear	which	real	
world	policy	instruments	could	reduce	the	sector’s	CO2	emissions	to	near-zero	sufficiently	fast.	
There	is	a	consensus	that	the	global	demand	for	heating	can	be	fulfilled	much	more	energy-efficiently,	
thereby	reducing	fuel	use	and	emissions	without	reducing	comfort	(Lucon	et	al.,	2014).	Heating	loads	
can	be	reduced	by	an	improved	thermal	insulation	of	houses,	and	the	remaining	heat	demand	can	be	
serviced	 by	 renewable	 and	 energy-efficient	 technologies.	 Through	 their	 integrated	 application,	
building	energy	use	can	be	reduced	by	up	to	90%	compared	to	conventional	buildings	(Urge-Vorsatz	
et	al.,	2013;	Ürge-Vorsatz	et	al.,	2012a).	Given	that	50%	of	the	current	building	stock	will	still	be	in	use	
by	2050	(75%	in	OECD	countries)	(IEA,	2013b),	levels	of	building	efficiency	in	the	next	decades	strongly	
depend	on	building	shell	retrofits	of	existing	houses	(Ürge-Vorsatz	et	al.,	2015b,	2012b).		
Aside	from	space	heating,	over	40%	of	global	heat	demand	is	for	water	heating,	which	is	less	impacted	
by	 insulation	 (Connolly	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 but	 likely	 to	 rise	with	 growing	 income	 in	many	world	 regions	
(Daioglou	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Near-zero-emissions	 are	 thus	 unachievable	 as	 long	 as	 the	 remaining	 heat	
demand	 is	 not	 provided	 by	 renewable	 and	 efficient	 electricity-based	 technologies.	 Available	
alternatives	to	fossil	fuel	heating	systems	rely	on	the	use	of	biomass	(traditional	or	in	modern	boilers),	
electricity	(e.g.,	electric	resistance	or	immersion	heating),	ambient	heat	(heat	pumps)	or	solar	energy	
(solar	 thermal	 panels)	 (for	 an	 overview,	 see	 IEA,	 2014).	While	 the	 operation	 of	 solar	 and	 biomass	
systems	can	potentially	be	carbon-neutral	(abstracting	from	life-cycle	considerations2),	heating	with	
electricity	 can	 be	 a	 renewable	 technology	 once	 electricity	 generation	 is	 decarbonised,	 otherwise,	
																																								 																				
1	Cost	is	potentially	negative	when	mitigation	options	do	not	only	reduce	emissions,	but	also	the	underlying	
energy	use,	which	may	lead	to	savings	on	energy	expenses	in	excess	of	the	necessary	investment.	
2	Woody	biomass	can	be	considered	as	emission	neutral	assuming	that	plants	grow	to	compensate	the	carbon	
emitted	as	they	are	combusted,	so	that	the	stock	of	forests	(and	carbon	therein)	does	not	decline	as	a	result	of	
biomass	combustion.	For	discussions,	see	Zanchi	et	al.	(2012)	and	Lamers	and	Junginger	(2013).	
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electricity-related	emissions	must	be	accounted	for.	A	much	more	efficient	use	of	electricity	can	be	
achieved	 by	 heat	 pumps,	which	 upgrade	 the	 ambient	 low-temperature	 energy	 of	 an	 air,	water	 or	
ground	 source	 into	 higher-temperature	 heat	 for	 space	 and	 water	 heating,	 effectively	 achieving	
efficiencies	 of	 200-400%	 (average	 ratio	 of	 heat	 output	 to	 electricity	 input)	 (for	 an	 overview,	 see	
IEA/ETSAP	 and	 IRENA,	 2013).	 The	 cost-competitiveness	 of	 these	 capital	 intensive	 renewable	
technologies,	with	respect	to	incumbent	fossil	fuel	technologies,	strongly	depends	on	a	combination	
of	local	circumstances	(such	as	local	electricity	and	fuel	prices,	solar	irradiation),	generally	not	achieved	
in	most	countries.		
The	potential	of	modern	renewable	heating	technologies	remains	largely	unexploited:	their	combined	
use	(excluding	heat	pumps)	accounted	for	less	than	5%	of	global	heat	generation	in	2012	(for	a	market	
overview,	 see	 IEA,	 2014).	 Some	 countries	 have	 introduced	 policy	 instruments	 and	 market	 and	
institutional	conditions	for	incentivising	their	uptake,	most	commonly	in	the	form	of	capital	subsidies	
(e.g.	in	Austria	and	China),	fossil	carbon	taxes	(e.g.	in	Northern	Europe),	and	use	obligations	(e.g.	in	
Germany	and	Spain)	(Connor	et	al.,	2013;	Ürge-Vorsatz	et	al.,	2015a).	Due	to	such	policy	support,	an	
increased	diffusion	of	renewables	can	be	observed	in	some	places	(such	as	solar	thermal	heating	in	
China):	from	2010-14,	their	combined	market	share	grew	by	8%	(International	Energy	Agency,	2017).	
While	progress	of	the	observed	extent	can	improve	the	energy	efficiency	of	heating	incrementally,	it	
is	 insufficient	 for	 achieving	 large	 absolute	 reductions	 in	 CO2	 emissions,	 which	 thus	 require	 more	
ambitious	policy	approaches	(Jotzo	et	al.,	2012;	Mundaca	et	al.,	2013;	Mundaca	and	Markandya,	2016;	
Wilhite	and	Norgard,	2004).		
Planning	for	a	technological	transition	in	the	heating	sector	requires	information	on	policy	strategies	
that	can	generate	the	right	level	of	incentive	to	achieve	the	required	changes	in	consumer	choices.	In	
this	paper,	we	focus	on	analysing	the	diffusion	of	renewable	and	efficient	heating	technologies	in	terms	
of	various	possible	choices	of	realistic	composite	policy	packages,	in	59	regions	of	the	world.	Which	
policy	 mixes	 could	 induce	 a	 sufficiently	 fast	 transition	 towards	 renewable	 heating,	 under	 which	
conditions	and	behavioural	assumptions,	and	how	long	would	it	take?	In	a	first	step,	we	use	the	IMAGE-
REMG	model	(Daioglou	et	al.,	2012;	Isaac	and	van	Vuuren,	2009)	to	project	trends	of	residential	heating	
demand	until	2050.	Our	focus,	however,	is	on	the	future	technology	portfolio,	which	depends	on	the	
choice	of	heating	technologies	by	households.	
We	project	household	choices	of	heating	technologies	using	the	‘Future	Technology	Transformations’	
model	FTT:Heat	(Knobloch	et	al.,	2017).	It	 is	a	bottom-up	simulation	model	of	technology	diffusion,	
aiming	to	project	how	the	technology	composition	of	residential	heating	systems	in	59	world	regions	
may	develop	until	2050	under	the	chosen	assumptions	on	heat	demand	and	choice	behaviour.	Based	
on	projected	preferences	and	decisions,	the	model	simulates	which	technologies	supply	which	share	
of	the	heating	market,	and	estimates	the	resulting	levels	of	fuel	use	and	emissions.	It	is	designed	to	
simulate	the	potential	impact	of	various	sets	of	possible	policy	strategies.	
The	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	In	section	2,	we	review	the	literature,	and	in	section	3	we	present	
our	model	and	data.	Policy	scenarios	and	results	of	the	model	simulations	are	presented	and	discussed	
in	section	4.	Section	5	concludes.	
	
2 Background	and	literature	
Residential	heat	generation	is	overwhelmingly	small	scale	and	distributed,	taking	place	on	site	within	
homes.	 The	 uptake	 of	 new	 heating	 equipment	 depends	 on	 the	 individual	 decision-making	 by	
heterogeneous	 households,	 each	 with	 subjective	 preferences	 and	 perceptions,	 and	 only	 limited	
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information,	time	and	cognitive	capacities	to	evaluate	alternative	options.	At	the	system	level,	the	sum	
of	such	decisions	inevitably	deviates	from	the	least-cost	optimum	as	it	would	be	determined	by	models	
that	assume	a	single,	fully	rational	agent	or	social	planner	(Kirman,	1992),	leading	to	the	criticism	that	
many	bottom-up	energy-models	are	based	an	unrealistic	representations	of	real	technology	choice-
making	(for	reviews,	see	Mundaca	et	al.,	2010;	Wilson	and	Dowlatabadi,	2007;	Worrell	et	al.,	2004).	
Avoiding	 costly	 policy-design	 failures	 requires	 an	 upfront	 simulation	of	 policy	 effects,	 based	on	 an	
analysis	 that	 better	 represents	 people’s	 actual	 behaviour	 under	 bounded	 rationality	 and	 limited	
information,	and	accounting	for	nonlinear	diffusion	dynamics	 (Mercure	et	al.,	2016;	Rai	and	Henry,	
2016).	 A	 behavioural	modelling	 of	 decision-making	 is	 particularly	 relevant	 for	 policies	 aiming	 at	 a	
premature	replacement	of	existing	systems,	which	will	 likely	be	necessary	for	deep	decarbonisation	
(Geels	et	al.,	2017).	For	instance,	in	such	decisions,	households	are	found	to	apply	very	strict	payback	
thresholds	(Newell	and	Siikamki,	2015;	Olsthoorn	et	al.,	2017),	reflected	in	high	implicit	discount	rates	
as	estimated	from	consumer	choices	(Hausman,	1979;	Schleich	et	al.,	2016;	Sutherland,	1991;	Train,	
1985).	In	this	section,	we	review	the	aspects	relevant	to	building	a	simulation-based	diffusion	model	
that	takes	into	account	known	behavioural	features	of	decision-making.	
2.1 Household	decision	making	
Applied	behavioural	research	shows	that	household	decisions	between	different	heating	systems	are	
driven	by	 a	diverse	 set	 of	 individual	 preferences	 and	behavioural	 characteristics	 (for	 a	 review,	 see	
Kastner	 and	 Stern,	 2015).	Multiple	 studies	 find	 that	main	 determinants	 of	 investments	 in	 heating	
systems	are	related	to	costs	(Achtnicht	and	Madlener,	2014;	Lillemo	et	al.,	2013;	Sopha	et	al.,	2011).	
Other	significant	factors	are	the	influence	by	social	norms,	and	social	comparisons	with	peers	(Hecher	
et	al.,	2017;	Sopha	et	al.,	2010).	Michelsen	and	Madlener	(2012)	find	that	preferences	depend	on	socio-
demographic	(e.g.	age,	education),	spatial	(e.g.	urban/rural)	and	home	characteristics	(e.g.	home	type,	
size).	Wilson	et	al.	(2015)	point	out	that	energy	efficiency	investments	should	not	be	seen	in	isolation,	
but	as	processes	that	emerge	from	social	practices.	Psychological	and	sociological	research	points	to	
the	behavioural	relevance	of	norms,	attitudes,	values,	motivation	and	social	influence,	all	of	which	can	
impact	technology	choice	(Abrahamse	et	al.,	2005;	Abrahamse	and	Steg,	2009;	Clayton	et	al.,	2015;	
Dietz	et	al.,	2009;	Steg,	2008;	Stern,	1986;	Wilson	and	Dowlatabadi,	2007).	
The	 heterogeneity	 of	 household	 characteristics	 and	 perceptions	 may	 partly	 explain	 the	 ‘energy	
efficiency	 gap’	 (Allcott	 and	 Greenstone,	 2012;	 Jaffe	 and	 Stavins,	 1994)	 between	 a	 hypothetical	
optimum	 as	 seen	 from	 an	 outside	 economics-engineering	 perspective	 and	 observed	 household	
decisions,	 which	 seem	 to	 undervalue	 future	 energy	 savings	 relative	 to	 upfront	 investment	 costs,	
resulting	in	a	typically	lower	than	expected	uptake	of	energy-efficient	technologies	(reflected	in	high	
empirical	estimates	of	 implicit	discount	rates,	as	reviewed	by	Hausman,	1979;	Train,	1985).	Various	
explanations	are	discussed	in	the	literature	(for	a	review,	see	Gillingham	and	Palmer,	2014),	which	can	
be	grouped	 into	market	barriers	 (e.g.,	hidden	costs),	market	 failures	(e.g.,	asymmetric	or	 imperfect	
information,	 split	 incentives)	 and	 systematic	 behavioural	 biases,	 as	 described	 by	 behavioural	
economics	 (e.g.,	 loss	 aversion,	 suboptimal	 decision	 heuristics,	 status-quo	 bias,	 saliency,	
procrastination)	 (Allcott	and	Mullainathan,	2010;	Bager	and	Mundaca,	2017;	Frederick	et	al.,	2002;	
Kahneman	and	Tversky,	1979;	Lillemo,	2014;	Shogren	and	Taylor,	2008;	Simon,	1955).			
The	cumulative	effect	of	household	heterogeneity,	imperfect	information	and	social	influence	implies	
that	 the	 diffusion	 of	 new	 technologies	 does	 not	 happen	 instantaneously	 once	 they	 become	
economically	 attractive,	 but	 typically	 follows	 an	 S-shaped	 trajectory	 (Rogers,	 2010):	 a	 slow	 initial	
growth	 is	driven	by	a	small	group	of	early	adopters,	eventually	 followed	by	the	 large	majority	and,	
finally,	 laggards.	 The	 process	 is	 further	 amplified	 by	 learning-based	 gradual	 cost	 decreases	 once	 a	
technology	 grows	 in	 market	 share	 (Weiss	 et	 al.,	 2010),	 the	 nature	 and	 scale	 of	 transaction	 costs	
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(Mundaca	T	et	al.,	2013),	and		 industrial	dynamics	(e.g.	capacity	constraints,	see	Wilson,	2012).	For	
energy	technologies,	these	up-scaling	dynamics	have	been	extensively	studied	(Grübler	et	al.,	1999;	
Wilson	and	Grubler,	2011),	emphasising	the	significance	of	formative	phases	and	path	dependence.	
The	 resulting	 technology	 transitions	usually	 take	decades	 rather	 than	years,	being	accompanied	by	
changes	in	regulation,	infrastructure,	user	practices	and	culture	(Geels,	2002).	Hence,	policies	aiming	
at	transitions	must	be	designed	with	an	understanding	of	how	new	technologies	slowly	diffuse	out	of	
niches,	and	of	households’	diverse	motivations	to	adopt	and	use	them.	
2.2 Modelling	of	the	diffusion	of	heating	systems	
Various	types	of	energy	end-use	models	exists,	which	can	be	grouped	into	various	categories,	such	as	
accounting-based,	 optimisation,	 agent-based	 or	 bottom-up	 (Mundaca	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Worrell	 et	 al.,	
2004),	 each	 with	 different	 (or	 sometimes	 no)	 representations	 of	 decision-making	 (Wilson	 and	
Dowlatabadi,	 2007).	 Many	 national	 or	 global	 level	 energy-economy	 models	 (such	 as	 Integrated	
Assessment	Models)	are	of	normative	nature,	used	for	analysing	the	cost-effectiveness	(e.g.,	TIMES,	
MESSAGE)	or	cost-benefit	ratio	(e.g.,	FUND,	PAGE,	DICE)	of	technology	pathways	from	a	social	planning	
perspective	 (Li	 et	 al.,	 2015).3	While	 such	 an	 approach	 can	be	 insightful	 for	 exploring	 cost-effective	
technology	pathways,	optimization	models	mostly	neglect	behavioural,	social	and	industrial	dynamics,	
effectively	assuming	that	a	single	representative	agent	with	perfect	information	and	foresight	is	taking	
the	decisions.	The	analysis	of	how	(and	if)	a	scenario	can	be	achieved	with	which	types	of	incentives	
requires	 simulation	 models	 that	 better	 capture	 some	 of	 the	 complex	 interactions	 between	
heterogeneous	agents	(Mercure	et	al.,	2016),	and	some	of	the	salient	behavioural	features	involved	in	
real	decision-making,	a	need	which	is	also	highlighted	in	IPCC-AR5	(Kolstad	et	al.,	2014).	
For	the	heating	sector,	some	attempts	have	been	made	to	introduce	a	representation	of	household	
behaviour	into	optimization	bottom-up	models	of	technology	uptake.	Cayla	and	Maïzi	(2015)	extended	
the	TIMES-Households	model	for	France	by	including	different	household	categories.	Also	for	France,	
Giraudet	et	al.	(2012)	introduce	consumer	heterogeneity	and	intangible	costs	into	a	bottom-up	sub-
module	of	IMACLIM-R.	Li	(2017)	presents	an	optimization	model	with	heterogeneous	decision-making	
which	covers	heating	in	the	UK.	However,	most	of	these	studies	feature	a	relatively	low	resolution	of	
technology	types	for	heating,	and	are	restricted	to	one	(or	mostly	a	few)	countries.	Furthermore,	the	
behaviour	 represented	 typically	 comes	 in	 the	 form	 of	 frictions	 or	 externalities	 (e.g.,	 using	 higher	
discount	rates)	 introduced	to	prevent	the	models	 from	reaching	their	otherwise	normative	optimal	
technological	configurations.	
As	 an	 alternative	 to	 optimization,	 several	 authors	 have	 developed	 agent-based	models	 (ABMs)	 of	
heating	 system	 uptake,	 such	 as	 Sopha	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 for	wood-pellet	 heating	 in	 Norway.	While	 the	
approach	 allows	 the	 simulation	 of	 heterogeneous	 households,	 non-standard	 decision	 making	 and	
social	influences,	the	calibration	of	ABMs	requires	a	rich	set	of	socio-economic	data,	usually	generated	
by	household	surveys	and	interviews,	which	implies	challenging	requirements	for	their	application	on	
a	larger	scale	(Rai	and	Henry,	2016).	A	more	qualitative	approach	of	analysis	is	taken	in	the	‘Energy	
Efficiency	 in	 Buildings’	 model,	 which	 provides	 a	 replicable	 methodology	 for	 local	 market	 analysis	
(WBCSD,	2016).		
A	modelling	approach	of	intermediate	complexity	is	the	use	of	discrete	choice	models	with	multinomial	
logit	structures	for	representing	household	diversity,	such	as	the	CIMS	model	for	energy	demand	in	
Canada	 (Rivers	 and	 Jaccard,	 2005),	 the	 Invert/EE-Lab	model	 for	building-related	energy	demand	 in	
																																								 																				
3	Under	the	incorrect	assumption	that	the	sum	of	individual	cost-optimisers	corresponds	to	a	cost-optimising	
social	planner,	optimisation	is	often	seen	as	descriptive,	otherwise	optimisation	is	always	normative	(Mercure,	
2017).	
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selected	European	countries	(Kranzl	et	al.,	2013;	Stadler	et	al.,	2007),	and	the	bottom-up	models	of	
household	 energy	 use	 by	 Van	 Ruijven	 et	 al.	 (2011)	 and	 Daioglou	 (Daioglou	 et	 al.,	 2012)	 (together	
forming	the	REMG	model	component	of	IMAGE,	see	section	3.1),	differentiating	for	urban	and	rural	
households	and	including	income	distributions.	Some	of	these	models	are	technology-rich	and	coupled	
with	detailed	building-physics	models	of	the	housing	stock	(e.g.,	Invert),	which	increases	their	degree	
of	realism	from	an	engineering	perspective.	At	the	same	time,	the	data	requirements	are	immense,	so	
that	models	either	tend	to	focus	on	a	limited	set	of	countries	(CIMS	and	Invert),	or	only	have	limited	
technology	representation	(IMAGE-REMG).	
Modelling	 the	global	scale	 is	crucial	 in	questions	 related	to	climate	 targets,	as	 it	 is	 the	only	way	to	
calculate	global	emissions	 required	 to	estimate	climate	change.	We	acknowledge	 the	difficulties	 to	
include	(and	parameterise)	behavioural	dynamics	and	diversity	with	only	limited	data	available	at	the	
global	 scale,	 given	 that	 such	behavioural	 features	must	vary	by	 country.	 In	FTT:Heat,	we	 therefore	
choose	 a	 compromise:	 heterogeneous	 decision-making	 and	 social	 dynamics	 are	 represented	 in	 a	
stylised	but	tractable	way.	To	the	best	of	our	knowledge,	there	exists	so	far	no	similar	simulation	model	
for	 the	 diffusion	 of	 heating	 systems	 at	 the	 global	 scale.	 This	 enables	 FTT:Heat	 to	 be	made	 into	 a	
component	of	a	new	type	of	integrated	assessment	model,	E3ME-FTT-GENIE	(Mercure	et	al.,	2018).	
	
3 Methods	and	data	
3.1 Simulating	future	heat	demand	with	IMAGE-REMG	
First,	we	use	the	IMAGE-REMG	model	to	project	future	changes	in	heat	demand	(𝑈𝐸#$#),	directly	after	
the	methodology	described	in	Isaac	and	van	Vuuren	(2009)	and	Daioglou	et	al.	(2012).	Demand	levels	
are	projected	 for	 (i)	 a	baseline	 scenario,	 (ii)	 a	mitigation	 scenario	 consistent	with	 limiting	 radiative	
forcing	to	1.9W/m2	(1.5°C	target),	involving	increased	efficiency	of	new	buildings,	and	(iii)	a	variant	of	
the	mitigation	scenario	which	additionally	assumes	increased	retrofitting	of	existing	houses.		
IMAGE-REMG	projects	𝑈𝐸#$#	as	the	sum	of	demand	for	space	and	water	heating.	For	water	heating,	
future	demand	per	person	is	modelled	as	a	function	of	income,	converging	to	a	maximum	saturation	
value	which	depends	on	heating	degree	days	(HDD)	(Daioglou	et	al.,	2012).	For	space	heating,	demand	
is	modelled	as	a	function	of	population,	floor	space	per	person	(m2/cap),	heating	degree	days	(HDD),	
and	the	useful	energy	heating	intensity	(𝑈𝐸/𝑚)/𝐻𝐷𝐷)	(Isaac	and	van	Vuuren,	2009):	𝑈𝐸,-./0 = 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑥	𝑚)/𝑐𝑎𝑝	𝑥	𝐻𝐷𝐷	𝑥	𝑈𝐸/𝑚)/𝐻𝐷𝐷	 (1)	
	
Future	changes	in	population,	climate	and	income	are	exogenous	drivers,	based	on	the	SSP	(Shared	
Socioeconomic	Pathway)	2	(‘middle	of	the	road’)	(see	Riahi	et	al.,	2017).	The	mitigation	scenario	(SSP2-
1.9)	projects	reductions	in	heating	intensity	which	would	be	consistent	with	achieving	the	1.5°C	target,	
which	 implies	 an	 improved	 thermal	 insulation	of	houses	 (e.g.,	 by	means	of	building	 standards	 and	
retrofits).	 All	 relevant	 data	 is	 publicly	 available	 via	 the	 IMAGE	website	 (including	 future	 trends	 in	
m2/cap,	HDD	and	𝑈𝐸,-./0)	(PBL,	2018).	
Floor	space	is	an	intermediate	driver,	calculated	as	a	function	of	income	and	population	density.	HDD	
are	derived	from	monthly	mean	temperatures,	taking	 into	account	future	 levels	of	global	warming.	
Heating	intensity	foremost	depends	on	heating	practices	and	levels	of	building	insulation,	with	current	
values	 ranging	 from	 50-200kJUE/m2/HDD.	 In	 both	 the	 SSP2	 and	 SSP2-1.9	 scenarios,	 the	 heating	
intensity	of	all	houses	is	assumed	to	decrease	towards	an	average	of	90kJUE/m2/HDD	by	2100	in	all	
world	 regions	 (from	100-150	kJUE/m2/HDD	by	2050),	or	 remain	at	 the	current	 level	 if	 this	 is	 lower,	
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meant	to	reflect	the	improvement	of	worst	performing	buildings	with	a	convergence	towards	current	
average	 intensities.	 In	 the	 SSP2-1.9	 scenario,	 it	 is	 additionally	 assumed	 that	 the	 adoption	 of	more	
efficient	 insulation	 in	 newly	built	 houses	 reduces	 the	overall	 useful	 energy	demand	by	up	 to	 35%,	
compared	to	SSP2	(corresponding	roughly	to	the	“sub-optimal”	scenario	in	the	GEA,	see	Ürge-Vorsatz	
et	al.,	2012a).	The	retrofitting	scenario	is	identical	to	SS2-1.9,	but	assumes	that	the	heating	intensity	
decreases	 towards	 45kJ/m2/HDD	by	 2050,	 involving	 rapid	 insulation	 improvements	of	 the	 existing	
building	stock.4	
3.2 Simulating	technology	uptake	with	FTT:Heat	
The	core	of	FTT:Heat	is	a	simulation	of	technology	diffusion,	in	which	individual	heating	technologies	
(e.g.,	gas	boilers,	heat	pumps)	compete	for	market	shares	of	the	total	heat	demand.	Importantly,	the	
model	does	not	minimise	or	maximise	some	objective	function,	such	as	system	cost	or	intertemporal	
utility.	Instead,	it	simulates	the	decision-making	of	households:	under	given	behavioural	assumptions	
and	 levels	of	heat	demand,	which	heating	 technologies	would	 they	 choose,	and	how	 fast	 can	new	
technologies	grow	within	the	market?	
Initial	 market	 shares	 of	 individual	 technologies	 i,	 𝑆? 𝑡 ,	 are	 calculated	 from	 historic	 data	 on	 heat	
generation	by	technology,	𝑈𝐸? 𝑡 ,	as:	𝑆? 𝑡 = 𝑈𝐸? 𝑡𝑈𝐸#$#(𝑡), 𝑆? 𝑡 = 1?  
	
(2)	
	
At	every	time	step	𝛥𝑡	of	the	simulation	(set	to	1/4	year),	FTT:Heat	models	the	change	in	future	market	
shares	based	on	three	central	elements	(further	described	below):	
1. Decision-making	by	diverse	households	
2. Dynamic	growth	of	technologies	
3. Learning	by	doing	
	
Figure	1	An	illustration	of	technology	substitution	over	time	in	FTT:Heat.	(1)	Each	period,	in	each	region,	some	households	
decide	between	heating	systems,	based	on	distributed	costs	and	intangibles.	(2)	All	available	technologies	are	compared	
with	each	other,	and	resulting	household	preferences	stored	in	the	matrix	F.	(3)	The	dynamic	shares	equation	simulates	
the	resulting	net	changes	in	each	technology’s	market	shares	(Si).	
																																								 																				
4	The	Passive	House	standard	requires	a	maximum	space	heating	energy	demand	of	15	kWh/m2	(PHI,	2018).	
This	roughly	translates	to	a	maximum	useful	heating	intensity	of	20	kJ/m2/HDD.	As	we	model	aggregate	heating	
intensity,	reducing	global	heating	intensity	from	50-200	to	45	kJ/m2/HDD	over	a	30-year	period	is	very	
ambitious,	and	implies	a	large	portion	of	households	adopting	passive	house	properties.	
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From	the	resulting	shares,	the	model	projects	the	new	levels	of	useful	energy	demand	per	technology,	𝑈𝐸? 𝑡 .	𝑈𝐸?	can	change	when	the	technology	composition	(𝑆?)	changes,	and/or	when	the	total	demand	for	
heating	(𝑈𝐸#$#)	changes.	Final	energy	demand,	fuel	use	and	capacities	are	then	estimated	based	on	
technology-specific	 conversion	 efficiencies	 and	 capacity	 factors	 (also	 depending	 on	 the	 climate).	
Negative	 changes	 in	 a	 technology's	 capacity	 correspond	 to	 decommissions	 that	 are	 not	 replaced.	
Finally,	on-site	CO2	emissions	are	calculated	from	projected	fuel	use,	based	on	the	respective	carbon	
content.	
3.2.1 Decision-making	by	diverse	households	
In	each	period,	a	fraction	of	households	decides	between	heating	systems:	either	for	replacing	existing	
systems	 that	 come	 to	 the	 end	 of	 their	 lifetime	 (or	 became	 so	 expensive	 to	 operate	 that	 they	 are	
replaced	ahead	of	that),	or	to	satisfy	new	demand.	
For	 systems	 coming	 to	 the	 end	 of	 their	 lifetime,	 FTT:Heat	 simulates	 a	 pairwise	 comparison	 of	 all	
available	 heating	 technologies	 by	 heterogeneous	 households,	 based	 on	 distributed	 costs	 and	
preferences.	These	are	represented	as	the	generalised	cost	of	heating,	𝐺𝐶𝑂𝐻?:	𝐺𝐶𝑂𝐻? = 𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐻? + 𝛾? 	 (3)	
	
GCOHi	consists	of	two	parts:	an	engineering-based	levelised	cost	calculation	(LCOHi),	and	an	empirical	
estimate	of	technology	characteristics	which	are	valued	by	households	(based	on	observed	technology	
uptake),	𝛾?.	Levelised	costs	are	calculated	for	all	technologies,	as:	
𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐻? = 𝐼𝐶?,#𝐶𝐹? + 𝑀𝑅?,#𝐶𝐹? + 𝐹𝐶?,#𝐶𝐸?(1 + 𝑟)## 1(1 + 𝑟)## 	 (4)	
	
ICi,t,	 MRi,t	 and	 FCi,t	 are	 upfront	 investment	 costs,	 maintenance-repair	 costs,	 and	 the	 fuel	 price	
respectively.	CFi	 is	 the	 capacity	 factor	 (depending	 on	 a	 region’s	 heating	 degree	 days),	 and	CEi	 the	
technological	conversion	efficiency	(output	of	useful	heat,	relative	to	input	of	fuel).	r	is	the	discount	
rate.	It	is	meant	to	describe	how	households	value	future	relative	to	present	costs,	using	a	rate	of	9%,	
based	on	Jaccard	and	Dennis	(2006)	(a	sensitivity	analysis	is	given	in	table	2)5.		In	addition,	policies	can	
be	imposed,	such	as	a	carbon	tax	or	a	capital	subsidy.	
As	a	representation	of	household	diversity,	 ICi,t,	MRi,t	and	FCi,t	are	all	distributed	around	their	mean	
values.	 Such	 diversity	 originates	 from	 different	 individual	 characteristics	 of	 the	 household,	 the	
technology	or	the	dwelling.	Accordingly,	LCOHi	 is	not	treated	as	a	unique	value,	but	as	a	frequency	
distribution	with	a	mean	and	a	standard	deviation,	combined	using	standard	error	propagation:	
𝛥𝐿𝐶𝑂𝐻? = ∆𝐼𝐶?)𝐶𝐹?) + ∆𝑀𝑅?)𝐶𝐹?) + ∆𝐹𝐶?)𝐶𝐸?) 	 
	
(5)	
Many	additional	aspects	may	be	valued	by	households	which	remain	unspecified	in	the	LCOHi,	such	as	
the	perceived	inconvenience	of	a	technology	(e.g.,	for	pellet	heating,	see	Sopha	et	al.,	2010),	possible	
																																								 																				
5	ideally,	we	would	have	similar	(and	recent)	empirical	studies	for	all	world	regions.	Unfortunately,	those	are	
not	available.	In	their	absence,	some	value	needs	to	be	chosen	as	a	discount	rate,	so	using	results	from	the	
cited	study	on	Canada	is	in	our	opinion	an	imperfect,	but	feasible	solution.	
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co-benefits	(e.g.,	using	a	heat	pump	for	cooling	purposes),	or	existing	policies,	called	the	‘intangibles’.	
Their	value	is	represented	in	the	technology-	and	region-specific	empirical	parameter	𝛾?.	It	is	derived	
using	a	calibration	with	historical	diffusion	data:	we	search	for	the	set	that	makes	the	rate	of	diffusion	
continuous	at	the	cross-over	between	historical	and	simulation	periods,	in	each	region	(a	description	
of	the	methodology	is	given	in	the	appendix).		
For	a	population	of	heterogeneous	households,	the	comparison	of	two	technologies	is	then	performed	
by	comparing	the	frequency	distributions	of	their	generalised	cost:		𝐹?P 𝛥𝐶?P = 𝐹P(𝐶)𝑓?(RSR 𝐶 − 𝛥𝐶?P)𝑑𝐶,				𝛥𝐶?P = 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝐻? − 𝐺𝐶𝑂𝐻P 	
	
(6)	
F(C)	 and	 f(C)	 are	 the	 cumulative	 cost	 distribution	 function	 and	 the	 cost	 distribution	 density,	
respectively.	𝐹?P 	 denotes	 the	 fraction	of	households	preferring	 technology	 i	 over	 technology	 j.	 It	 is	
calculated	 as	 the	 fraction	 of	 households	 for	 which	 the	GCOH	 with	 technology	 i	 is	 less	 than	 with	
technology	j	(i.e.,	the	model	calculates	a	binary	logit).	For	example,	if	𝐹?P = 0.7,	70%	of	households	in	
this	region	would	prefer	technology	i	over	j,	while	30%	have	the	reverse	preference.	The	comparison	
is	performed	for	all	possible	pairs	of	available	technologies,	resulting	in	a	complete	order	of	distributed	
household	preferences,	summarised	in	the	matrix	𝐹	(which	is	endogenously	calculated	for	all	regions,	
and	updated	in	each	simulation	period).	The	diversity	of	choices	implies	a	differentiation	of	the	market,	
in	 which	 households	 take	 different	 decisions	 at	 different	 points	 in	 time	 for	 different	 reasons,	 as	
described	by	diffusion	theory	(Rogers,	2010).		
3.2.2 Technology	diffusion	dynamics	
Once	preferences	are	estimated,	the	change	in	technology	shares	is	simulated	(Mercure	2015,	2012).	
First,	we	derive	the	substitution	of	market	shares	from	heating	technology	j	to	i	in	period	𝛥𝑡,	as:	𝛥𝑆P→? = 𝑆P𝐹?P𝜏PSZ𝑆?𝛥𝑡	
	
(7)	
Substitutions	from	j	to	i	depend	on	the	fraction	of	households	who	would	prefer	technology	i	over	
j	(the	preference	matrix	Fij,	which	is	newly	estimated	in	each	period),	the	previous	market	shares	of	
both	technologies	(Si	and	Sj),	and	the	fraction	of	technology	j	which	needs	to	be	replaced	(estimated	
as	the	inverse	of	its	average	technological	lifetime,	τj)6.	
Since	preferences	are	diverse,	another	fraction	of	households	may	have	the	reverse	preference,	and	
would	 choose	 technology	 j	 over	 i.	 We	 thus	 calculate	 the	 net	 substitution	 from	 technology	 j	 to	
technology	i.	Finally,	the	sum	of	all	such	pair-wise	comparisons	over	all	competing	technologies	j	yields	
the	cumulative	net	change	in	market	shares	of	technology	i:	𝛥𝑆? = 𝑆?𝑆P(𝐹?P𝜏PSZ − 𝐹P?𝜏?SZ)𝛥𝑡P 	
	
(8)	
																																								 																				
6	We	assume	homogenous	age	distributions	because	we	do	not	have	data	over	the	age	structure	of	heating	
systems	worldwide.	The	assumption	implies	that	if	a	fleet	of	heating	systems	of	a	particular	technology	has	
been	widely	adopted	in	a	country	in	a	very	short	time,	it	would	mean	that	they	would	need	replacement	in	a	
relatively	restricted	range	of	years,	which	would	break	our	assumption.	It	does	not	imply,	however,	that	new	
innovative	systems	could	be	replaced	instantaneously;	these	would	nevertheless	wait	until	their	end	of	life	to	
be	replaced	(unless	households	would	decide	to	replace	prematurely).	The	constraint	of	not	considering	the	
exact	age	distribution	is	furthermore	relaxed	by	the	fact	that	systems	have	a	probability	of	end	of	life	that	is	
distributed	over	time	(not	all	systems	of	the	same	type	end	up	with	the	exact	same	lifetime).		
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Formula	 (8)	 is	 the	 non-linear	 dynamic	 shares	 equation,	 conceptually	 similar	 to	 the	 modelling	 of	
imitation	 dynamics	 in	 evolutionary	 game	 theory	 (Hofbauer	 and	 Sigmund,	 1998),	 originating	 in	 the	
description	of	evolutionary	competition	between	different	species.	Each	single	flow	from	a	technology	
j	to	an	alternative	technology	i	is	determined	by	three	interacting	elements:		
I. Preferences	(Fij):	which	fraction	of	households	would	prefer	which	technology,	given	that	they	
were	to	buy	a	heating	system	within	period	𝛥𝑡?		
II. Replacement	needs	(𝑆P𝜏PSZ):	how	many	heating	systems	of	technology	j	need	replacement	in	
period	𝛥𝑡?		
III. Dynamic	 constraints	 (Si):	 given	 preferences	 and	 replacement	 needs,	 which	 fraction	 of	
substitutions	can	be	realised?		
Substitutions	 are	 dynamically	 constrained,	 as	 a	 stylised	 representation	 of	 (a)	 limited	 capacities	 to	
produce	and	install	new	technologies,	and	(b)	limited	information	and	behavioural	decision-making	on	
part	of	households.	Psychological	research	reports	that	households	typically	don’t	optimise,	but	tend	
to	stick	to	the	status	quo,	are	impacted	by	prevalent	social	norms,	or	follow	the	behaviour	of	others	
(Abrahamse	and	Steg,	2013;	Frederiks	et	al.,	2015).	For	heating	systems,	the	main	information	sources	
are	 interpersonal	 sources	 and	 installers	 (Mahapatra	 and	 Gustavsson,	 2008).	 For	 the	 diffusion	 of	
innovations,	 industrial	 and	 social	 dynamics	 are	 self-reinforcing,	 and	 both	make	 it	more	 likely	 that	
households	 choose	 dominant	 technologies.	 We	 represent	 these	 dynamics	 by	 constraining	 a	
technology’s	growth	by	its	market	share	(Si),	based	on	Mercure	(2017,	2015).	
As	a	central	 implication,	technology	transitions	 in	the	model	are	subject	to	 inertia,	as	technological	
trajectories	 cannot	 change	 direction	 rapidly,	 and	 resembles	 s-shapes	 diffusion	 curves.	 While	
undoubtedly	 remaining	 a	 stylised	 representation	 of	 underlying	 behavioural,	 social	 and	 industrial	
dynamics,	 it	 is	 an	 improvement	 in	 comparison	 to	 exogenous	 growth	 constraints	 in	 standard	
optimization	models,	since	here	the	constraint	is	fully	endogenous.		
Substitutions	 can	 be	 further	 constrained	 to	 account	 for	 behavioural	 and	 technical	
plausibility/feasibility.	We	follow	Kranzl	et	al.	 (2013)	and	assume	that	households	would	not	switch	
back	 to	 technologies	 with	 a	much	 lower	 comfort	 level,	 i.e.	 that	 households	 with	modern	 heating	
systems	(such	as	district	heat,	gas,	electricity)	would	not	go	back	to	coal	or	traditional	biomass.		
Finally,	 new	 levels	 of	 heat	 generation	 per	 technology	 (𝑈𝐸?)	 are	 obtained	 by	multiplying	 their	 new	
shares	by	a	region’s	total	heat	demand	(𝑈𝐸#$#)	(modelled	by	IMAGE-REMG).	
3.2.3 Premature	replacements		
Eq	 (8)	 would	 suggest	 that	 households	 replace	 heating	 devices	 only	 at	 the	 end	 of	 their	 lifetime.	
However,	in	reality,	households	may	consider	to	replace	functioning	heating	systems	ahead	of	that,	
based	 on	 economic	 considerations.	 For	 a	 household	 with	 perfect	 information	 and	 without	 risk-
aversion,	 this	would	be	beneficial	once	the	marginal	 running	costs	of	operating	the	current	system	
exceed	 the	 full	 levelised	 costs	 of	 buying	 and	 operating	 an	 alternative	 technology.	 In	 practice,	 it	 is	
known	that	households	apply	much	stricter	criteria,	and	only	consider	a	premature	replacement	if	the	
potential	 savings	 exceed	 the	 initial	 investment	 in	 a	 limited	 period	 of	 time	 -	 the	 so-called	payback	
threshold	(Gillingham	and	Palmer,	2014).		
Thus,	in	the	model,	premature	replacements	are	only	considered	as	sufficiently	attractive	if	(and	only	
if)	 the	 savings	 (due	 to	 reduced	 operating	 costs,	 MCi)	 exceed	 the	 investment	 costs	 of	 another	
technology	(ICj,	inclusive	of	an	eventual	subsidy)	within	the	considered	payback	time	(b),	so	if:	𝑀𝐶? > 	𝑀𝐶P + 	𝐼𝐶P/𝑏	 (9)	
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Given	costs,	decisions	strongly	depend	on	the	assumed	value	of	b.	In	choice	experiments	Olsthoorn	et	
al.	(2017)	find	that	the	mean	payback	threshold	for	a	premature	replacement	of	space	heating	systems	
is	 as	 low	 as	 3±1	 years,	 while	 Newell	 and	 Siikamäki	 (2015)	 report	 a	 mean	 threshold	 of	 3-5	 years.	
Assuming	that	this	applies	to	all	regions,	we	use	3±1	years.	A	sensitivity	for	b	is	given	in	section	4.4.		
3.2.4 Learning	by	doing	
We	endogenously	model	cost	reductions	in	upfront	investment	costs	over	time,	𝐼𝐶? 𝑡 ,	which	occur	
due	to	the	accumulation	of	knowledge	and	experience	(‘learning	by	doing’),	leading	to	the	empirically	
well-described	 phenomenon	 of	 learning	 curves.	 Endogenous	 cost	 reductions	 increases	 path	
dependence	in	technology	diffusion	(Arthur,	1989),	leading	to	increasing	returns	to	scale	for	growing	
technologies.			
In	each	period,	updated	investment	costs	are	calculated	as	a	function	of	the	increase	in	cumulative	
global	capacity	of	a	technology,	based	on	technology-specific	learning	rates:	they	describe	the	relative	
cost	reduction	that	is	expected	for	every	additional	doubling	of	the	global	capacity.	We	use	learning	
rates	from	a	review	of	empirical	evidence	by	Weiss	et	al.	(2010)	(given	in	the	appendix).		
3.2.5 Economic	feedbacks	
FTT:Heat	 is	 hard-linked	 to	 the	 macroeconometric	 global	 simulation	 model	 E3ME	 (Cambridge	
Econometrics,	2014),	most	importantly	via	variables	for	fuel	use	and	household	expenditures.	Policies	
which	are	primarily	 targeted	at	 the	heating	 sector	 can	 lead	 to	 changes	 in	households’	demand	 for	
different	 fuels,	 or	 to	 higher	 expenses	 for	 heating	 systems.	 For	 each	 year	 of	 the	 simulation,	 E3ME	
projects	the	wider	macroeconomic	impacts	of	such	effects,	and	allows	to	analyse	the	implications	for	
other	 economic	 sectors.	 We	 focus	 on	 the	 impact	 on	 electricity	 generation,	 and	 resulting	 indirect	
emissions	in	the	power	sector	(which	is	modelled	with	FTT:Power,	see	Mercure	et	al.,	2014).	
3.3 Data	
3.3.1 Energy	demand	
Only	 limited	 data	 is	 available	 on	 the	 specific	 demand	 for	 residential	 heating,	 the	 related	 fuel	
consumption	and	technology	composition	(IEA,	2014;	Lucon	et	al.,	2014).		We	combine	data	on	fuel	
use	and	technology	diffusion	from	various	sources,	and	provide	the	resulting	database	as	SI.	
Final	energy	demand	for	heating	in	EU	countries	is	taken	from	the	ODYSSEE	database	(Enerdata,	2017),	
which	contains	annual	data	for	space	and	water	heating	in	all	28	member	states.	For	non-EU	regions,	
the	IEA	energy	statistics	report	final	residential	energy	demand	by	fuel	type,	but	do	not	differentiate	
by	end	use	application	(IEA,	2017).	The	share	of	heating	in	household	energy	demand	strongly	depends	
on	climatic	conditions	and	levels	of	building	insulation,	ranging	from	10%	India	to	87%	in	Russia,	with	
water	heating	being	of	dominant	importance	in	warmer	climates	(IEA,	2013a).	We	calculate	the	shares	
of	heating	for	ASEAN,	Brazil,	China,	India,	Mexico,	Russia,	South	Africa	and	the	USA	based	on	estimates	
in	IEA	(2013a)	and	country-specific	sources	(Daioglou	et	al.,	2012;	Eom	et	al.,	2012;	Wang	and	Jiang,	
2017).	For	Sub-Saharan	Africa,	we	adjust	the	fuel	use	data	to	bottom-up	estimates	of	heat	demand	by	
the	IMAGE-REMG	model.	For	remaining	world	regions,	the	heating	share	is	estimated	based	on	heating	
degree	days,	assuming	a	comparable	heating	intensity	as	in	world	regions	with	a	similar	climate.	
Residential	heat	generation	by	solar	thermal	installations	for	most	world	regions	is	available	in	the	IEA	
energy	statistics,	which	we	amended	by	data	from	the	IEA	Solar	Heating	Programme	(Mauthner	et	al.,	
2016).	No	standardised	global	data	exists	on	heat	generation	by	heat	pumps.	For	most	EU	countries	
and	Norway,	time	series	were	available	from	the	European	Heat	Pump	Association	(2016),	which	was	
amended	by	data	from	EurObserv'ER	(2017).	For	other	world	regions,	the	heat	generation	by	ground-
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source	heat	pumps	is	taken	from	Lund	and	Boyd	(2016).	Data	on	the	use	of	air-source	heat	pumps	is	
taken	 from	country-specific	sources	where	available	 (China	Heat	Pump	Committee	of	China	Energy	
Conservation	Association,	2015	for	China;	EIA,	2017	for	USA;	Japan	Refrigeration	and	Air	Conditioning	
Industry	Association	(JRAIA),	2017	for	Japan;	Kegel	et	al.,	2014	for	Canada;	Lapsa	et	al.,	2017	for	the	
USA).		
In	 the	 model,	 data	 on	 final	 energy	 demand	 (Ei)	 is	 transformed	 into	 useful	 energy	 demand	 (UEi)	
according	to	technology-specific	conversion	efficiencies	(CEi)	(see	Appendix-Table	),	so	that:	𝑈𝐸? 𝑡 = 𝐸?(𝑡) ∗ 𝐶𝐸?		
	 (10)	
The	 resulting	 top-down	 estimate	 of	 heat	 demand	has	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 simplification,	 owing	 to	 the	
absence	of	reliable	information	on	residential	energy	end-use	in	most	world	regions,	and	is	subject	to	
the	uncertainty	of	underlying	data	and	assumed	efficiencies.		
We	estimate	 that	 in	2014,	global	 final	energy	demand	 for	 residential	 space	and	water	heating	was	
around	12PWh,	useful	energy	demand	9,6PWh,	direct	onsite	CO2	emissions	1,5GtCO2/y	(around	70%	
of	 reported	 direct	 residential	 building	 sector	 emissions	 in	 2010,	 Lucon	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 and	 indirect	
emissions	in	the	electricity	sector	0,5GtCO2/y.	
3.3.2 Technology	data	
Cost	 and	 performance	 data	 for	 the	 13	 different	 kinds	 of	 heating	 technologies	 is	 summarised	 in	
Appendix-Table	2.	Country-specific	Investment	costs	(incl.	of	installation)	for	EU	countries	are	taken	
from	 Fleiter	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 and	 Connolly	 (2014).	 For	 other	world	 regions,	we	 estimated	 the	 relative	
differences	in	investment	costs	from	levels	of	real	available	household	income.	A	standard	deviation	
equivalent	to	1/3	of	the	mean	cost	is	assumed	for	all	technologies	(Danish	Energy	Agency,	2016,	based	
on	cost	ranges	reported	by	2013;	NREL,	2016).	Residential	fuel	prices	are	taken	from	the	IEA	(2016a),	
with	an	assumed	standard	deviation	of	15%	(30%	for	biomass,	based	on	NREL,	2016).	More	details	and	
the	data	are	given	in	the	appendix.	
3.4 Scenario	definition	
We	created	ten	model	scenarios	(labeled	a-j)	aiming	at	a	decarbonisation	of	residential	heating	until	
2050,	all	of	which	use	a	different	set	of	policies,	implemented	from	2020	onwards.	Scenario	a	is	our	
baseline	projection,	without	improved	insulation	of	the	building	stock	(SSP2).	It	includes	a	continuation	
of	current	policies,	the	effect	of	which	is	implicitly	included	in	the	γ_	parameters.	Scenario	b	assumes	
increased	 levels	 of	 thermal	 insulation	 for	 new	 houses	 (SSP2-1.9).	 In	 scenario	 c,	 we	 simulate	 the	
additional	effects	of	having	more	ambitious	retrofitting	of	existing	buildings,	leading	to	further	demand	
reductions.	 In	 scenarios	 d-i,	 we	 explore	 combinations	 of	 three	 policy	 instruments,	 in	 addition	 to	
improved	insulation:	a	residential	carbon	tax,	technology	subsidies,	and	‘kick	start’	schemes	for	new	
technologies.	These	policies	were	chosen	based	on	their	successful	previous	implementation	in	at	least	
some	countries	(for	an	overview,	see	Connor	et	al.,	2013;	IEA,	2014),	as	well	as	from	advice	from	policy	
analysts	at	 the	European	Commission.	Scenario	 j	explores	complete	electrification.	We	assume	the	
political	acceptability	of	the	simulated	policies	for	the	purpose	of	our	analysis.	The	gap	between	the	
modelled	 carbon	 tax	 levels	 and	 levels	 observed	 in	 reality	 reflects	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 carbon	
pricing	mechanisms.		
I. The	(sectoral)	carbon	tax	is	specified	as	an	absolute	increase	in	the	household	price	of	fossil	
fuels,	relative	to	their	respective	carbon	content	(we	do	not	assume	an	inclusion	of	households	
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into	emissions	trading).7	We	simulate	carbon	taxes	of	50€/tCO2	 (scenario	d)	and	100€/tCO2	
(scenario	e).	From	2020-2050,	the	tax	is	assumed	to	linearly	increase	by	+10%	per	year,	relative	
to	its	respective	starting	value	(reaching	200€/tCO2	and	400€/tCO2	in	2050).	The	50€/tCO2	tax	
is	equivalent	to	fuel	price	increases	of	around	+0.01€/kWh	for	gas,	+0.013€/kWh	for	oil,	and	
+0.018€/kWh	for	coal.	 In	practice,	such	a	tax	may	also	take	the	form	of	subsidy	removal	 in	
countries	where	household	fuel	use	is	currently	subsidised	(e.g.,	in	form	of	reduced	VAT	rates,	
such	as	on	domestic	fuel	use	in	the	UK8).	
II. Technology	subsidies	are	defined	as	a	relative	reduction	in	a	renewable	heating	technology’s	
mean	upfront	investment	cost.	Eligible	are	solar	thermal,	heat	pumps,	and	modern	biomass.	
Two	subsidy	 rates	are	 simulated:	 -25%	 (scenario	 f)	 and	 -50%	 (scenario	g).	We	assume	 that	
subsidy	rates	remain	constant	from	2020	until	2030,	and	are	linearly	phased	out	afterwards,	
reaching	zero	in	2050.		
III. A	‘kick	start’	policy	is	not	market-based,	but	represents	a	policy	measure	that	introduces	a	new	
technology	by	means	of	 a	 procurement	 scheme,	use	obligation	 in	building	 codes,	 or	 other	
regulation.	 Such	 a	 policy	 is	 useful	 for	 driving	 initial	 markets	 in	 countries	 where	 a	 new	
technology’s	uptake	is	very	 limited	or	absent	so	far,	thereby	limiting	the	spread	of	relevant	
first-hand	 experiences	 between	 households,	 and	 preventing	 the	 build-up	 of	 necessary	
expertise	and	capacity	in	the	building	and	heating	industries.	Precedents	for	such	policies	can	
be	 found	 in	 Spain	 and	 Germany,	 amongst	 others	 (Connor	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 In	 the	model,	 we	
represent	such	a	policy	for	limited	time	periods	(5-10	years)	by	assuming	that	in	each	year,	one	
percentage	point	of	the	dominant	fossil	fuel	technology’s	market	share	is	replaced	by	a	mix	of	
renewable	alternatives.	
Scenarios	d-g	focus	on	single	policy	instruments,	while	policy	mixes	involving	two	or	more	policies	are	
simulated	in	scenarios	h-j.	
For	all	scenarios,	we	assume	constant	energy	prices,	for	two	reasons:	first,	future	energy	prices	are	
highly	 uncertain,	 especially	 in	 a	 context	 of	 global	 deep	 decarbonisation.	 Effectively,	 this	 makes	
constant	prices	as	likely	as	any	other	scenario.	Second,	it	allows	for	a	clearer	identification	of	policy	
effects,	which	may	otherwise	be	convoluted	with	the	effects	of	a	change	in	energy	prices.	A	sensitivity	
analysis	 shows	 that	 our	 results	 do	 not	 substantially	 differ	 under	 increasing	 and	 decreasing	 future	
energy	prices	and	other	parameters	(see	table	2).	
In	all	scenarios,	solar	thermal	is	limited	to	the	demand	of	water	heating	in	each	country	(as	it	is	mainly	
used	for	water	heating,	and	only	as	a	supplementary	source	for	space	heating).	District	heating	is	only	
an	option	in	those	regions	where	it	already	exists	(we	do	not	assume	the	construction	of	new	heat	
networks,	which	could	well	be	an	alternative	to	decentralised	renewable	heating	in	some	regions).	
																																								 																				
7	The	specific	carbon	tax	is	only	applied	to	the	residential	sector,	and	not	assumed	to	be	linked	to	other	sectors,	
such	as	the	power	sector,	which	is	subject	to	a	separate	set	of	policies.	
8	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/vat-notice-70119-fuel-and-power/vat-notice-70119-fuel-and-
power	
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4 Results	
4.1 Heat	demand	
	
Figure	2	Projections	of	future	residential	heat	demand	(space+water)	by	world	region,	for	(a)	a	baseline	scenario	in	which	
heating	intensity	converges	to	90kJ/m2/HDD	by	2100	(SSP2),	(b)	a	scenario	of	improved	building	insulation	of	new	houses	
in	the	context	of	climate	policy	(SSP2-1.9),	and	(c)	a	scenario	which	additionally	assumes	rapid	thermal	retrofitting	of	the	
existing	building	stock,	so	that	the	heating	intensity	converges	to	45kJ/m2/HDD	by	2050.	
We	first	estimate	future	residential	demand	for	space	and	water	heating	under	different	assumptions	
on	future	building	efficiency	and	retrofitting,	by	applying	projected	demand	trends	from	IMAGE-REMG	
to	 the	historically	estimated	heat	demand	 in	2014.	 Figure	2	depicts	 the	 resulting	baseline	demand	
trends	by	world	region	(SSP2,	in	which	heating	intensity	globally	converges	to	90kJ/m2/HDD	by	2100),	
a	scenario	of	improved	efficiency	of	newly	built	houses	(SSP2-1.9),	and	a	scenario	which	additionally	
assumes	increased	levels	of	retrofitting	of	the	existing	building	stock	(assuming	a	decrease	to	a	heating	
intensity	 of	 45kJ/m2/HDD	 by	 2050).	 It	 becomes	 evident	 that	 changes	 in	 future	 global	 demand	 do	
strongly	depend	on	China,	which	currently	still	shows	very	low	levels	of	average	heating	intensity.	Large	
demand	 increases	 are	 projected	 with	 continuously	 rising	 income,	 which	 may	 still	 be	 limited	 by	
improved	building	efficiency	of	newly	built	housing	stock.	Projected	increases	in	warmer	world	regions	
mainly	 reflect	 growing	 demand	 for	 water	 heating,	 which	 empirically	 depends	 on	 income,	 and	 is	
unaffected	by	our	assumptions	on	housing	insulation.	Estimated	effects	of	retrofitting	are	largest	in	
Western	Europe	and	North	America,	where	heat	demand	remains	high,	but	is	largely	saturated.	
4.2 Policies	for	decarbonisation	
The	main	results	for	policy	scenarios	a-j	are	illustrated	by	Figure	3,	which	shows	the	projected	global	
technology	 composition	 (left)	 and	 CO2	 emissions	 (right)	 until	 2050.	 Indirect	 CO2	 emissions	 from	
electricity	use	are	projected	by	FTT:Power,	assuming	a	power	sector	decarbonisation	scenario	that	is	
consistent	with	limiting	global	warming	to	1.5C°	(reaching	zero	emissions	on	the	global	level	by	2040)	
(the	emission	trends	for	all	regions	are	given	in	the	SI).	In	addition,	dashed	lines	show	the	total	emission	
levels	under	baseline	trends	of	power	sector	decarbonisation.	Table	1	presents	the	cumulative	changes	
in	CO2	emissions	from	2020-2050.	More	details	on	the	induced	technology	diffusion	in	five	major	world	
regions	can	be	found	in	the	appendix.	
Values	from	1995-2014	are	estimates	based	on	historical	data,	while	the	model	simulation	starts	 in	
2015	 (indicated	by	 the	dashed	vertical	 line).	 2014	values	 for	 total	 heat	demand	and	emissions	are	
represented	as	horizontal	dashed	 lines.	 In	plots	 for	scenarios	b-j,	 solid	curves	 indicate	 the	baseline	
demand	trend	(from	scenario	a).	Percentage	values	refer	to	changes	in	demand	and	total	annual	CO2	
emissions	by	2050,	relative	to	2014.	Values	in	brackets	refer	to	the	respective	changes	in	direct	CO2	
emissions.	
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Figure	3	Global	technology	composition	and	CO2	emissions	(direct	on-site	and	indirect	emissions	from	electricity	use)	in	
the	 residential	 heating	 sector,	 under	 current	 trends	 (a),	 improved	 building	 insulation	 (b),	 improved	 insulation	 and	
retrofitting	(c),	and	seven	policy	scenarios	aimed	at	technology	uptake	(d-j).	Model	simulations	by	FTT:Heat	start	in	2015	
(indicated	by	vertical	dashed	lines).	Horizontal	dashed	lines	represent	2014	levels.	Solid	curves	show	the	baseline	demand	
trends	from	scenario	a,	and	dashed	curves	the	total	emissions	should	the	power	sector	not	be	decarbonised.	Percentage	
values	refer	to	the	change	by	2050,	relative	to	2014.	Bold	percentage	values	indicate	the	reduction	in	annual	total	CO2	
emissions	(direct	+	indirect),	the	values	in	brackets	show	the	corresponding	reduction	in	direct	on-site	CO2	emissions.	
In	our	baseline	projection	under	current	policies	and	diffusion	trends	(scenario	a),	annual	direct	CO2	
would	peak	by	2030,	before	returning	to	their	2014	level	by	2050.	Given	the	projected	increase	in	heat	
demand	of	+46%,	this	suggests	a	decrease	in	the	direct	emission	intensity	by	around	30%.	Importantly,	
these	 changes	 in	 our	 baseline	 do	 not	 result	 from	 any	 exogenous	 efficiency	 change,	 but	 from	 the	
endogenous	continuation	of	current	technology	diffusion	trends:	the	model	projects	a	continuously	
increasing	market	 share	of	heat	pumps,	 solar	 thermal	heating	and	modern	biomass	 systems.	Their	
combined	share	would	grow	from	9p.p.	(percentage	points)	of	heat	production	in	2014,	to	30p.p.	in	
2050.	An	uptake	of	more	efficient	gas	heating	systems	and	a	gradual	replacement	of	coal	and	oil	based	
systems	leads	to	further	emission	reductions.	Still,	fossil	fuel	systems	are	projected	to	supply	a	more	
or	less	constant	amount	of	heat,	and	keep	a	combined	market	share	of	40p.p.	by	2050,	down	from	
CoalOil Oil (condensing) Gas Gas (condensing) Wood (stove) Wood (boiler)
District Electric HP (Ground) HP (Air-Water) HP (Air-Air) Solar Thermal
PWh/y Gt/yHeat generation CO2 Emissions PWh/y Heat generation CO2 Emissions
0
5
10
0
5
10
0
5
10
0
5
10
2000 2020 2040
0
5
10
0
1
2
0
1
2
0
1
2
2000 2020 2040
0
1
2
0
1
2
b
+9%
+9%
+18%
+46%
+9%
Baselinea
e
c
Fuel tax 1:
50-200¤/tCO2
Fuel tax 2:
100-400¤/tCO2
Impr. insulation + 
incr. retrofitting
Improved
insulation
-18% (0%)
-31%  (-16%)
-37% (-24%)
-77% (-80%)
-84% (-95%)
0
5
10
0
5
10
0
5
10
0
5
10
2000 2020 2040
0
5
10
0
1
2
0
1
2
0
1
2
2000 2020 2040
0
2
4
0
1
2
+9%
+9%
+9%
+9%
+9%
-90% (-95%)
f
g
h
i
j
Subsidy 1:
-25% until 2030
Subsidy 2:
-50% until 2030
Fuel tax 1 +
Subsidy 2
Fuel tax 1 + Subsidy 2 + 
'Kick start' 
Fuel tax 2 + 
subsidised elec.
-49% (-39%)
-62% (-57%)
-85% (-90%)
-73% (-99%)
Gt/y
d
	 16	
50p.p.	in	2014.	Total	emissions	are	projected	to	decrease	by	-18%	by	2050,	given	that	the	power	sector	
is	decarbonised.	
Table	1	Cumulative	2020-2050	CO2	emissions,	by	residential	heating	and	electricity	generation	for	residential	heating,	in	
GtCO2.	The	top	row	shows	absolute	values	in	the	baseline	scenario	(a),	the	following	rows	the	changes	relative	to	baseline	
in	scenarios	with	improved	insulation	and	heating	decarbonisation	(b-j).	Emissions	by	electricity	generation	are	shown	for	
a	 scenario	with	 a	 power	 sector	 decarbonisation	 trajectory	 consistent	with	 limiting	 global	warming	 to	 1.5°C	 (i),	 and	 a	
scenario	without	further	decarbonisation	of	the	power	sector	(ii).	
	 	
Residential		
heating	
Electricity	generation	for	heating	 Heating	+	Electricity	
	 Scenario	 (i)	Decarbonisation	
(ii)		
Baseline	
(i)	
Decarbonisation	
(ii)		
Baseline	
Baseline	
(GtCO2)	
a	 51Gt	 9Gt	 26Gt	 60Gt	 78Gt	
Diff.	to	
baseline	
(ΔGtCO2)	
b	 -8Gt	(-15%)	 -1Gt	(-16%)	 -5Gt	(-19%)	 -9Gt	(-15%)	 -13Gt	(-16%)	
c	 -9Gt	(-18%)	 -1Gt	(-16%)	 +5Gt	(+20%)	 -11Gt	(-18%)	 -15Gt	(-19%)	
d	 -25Gt	(-48%)	 +1Gt	(+11%)	 +6Gt	(+21%)	 -24Gt	(-40%)	 -19Gt	(-25%)	
e	 -31Gt	(-61%)	 +3Gt	(+39%)	 +13Gt	(+50%)	 -28Gt	(-47%)	 -18Gt	(-23%)	
f	 -13Gt	(-26%)	 -1Gt	(-14%)	 -4Gt	(-16%)	 -14Gt	(-24%)	 -17Gt	(-22%)	
g	 -19Gt	(-36%)	 -1Gt	(-11%)	 -3Gt	(-11%)	 -20Gt	(-23%)	 -21Gt	(-28%)	
h	 -30Gt	(-59%)	 +1Gt	(+12%)	 +4Gt	(+14%)	 -29Gt	(-49%)	 -27Gt	(-35%)	
i	 -32Gt	(-63%)	 +1Gt	(+11%)	 +4Gt	(+14%)	 -31Gt	(-52%)	 -29Gt	(-37%)	
j	 -36Gt	(-71%)	 +20Gt	(+236%)	 +77Gt	(+292%)	 -16Gt	(-28%)	 +40Gt	(+52%)	
	
In	 scenario	 b,	 improved	 insulation	 of	 houses	 would	 reduce	 overall	 heat	 demand	 in	 2050	 by	 20%	
(relative	to	baseline	scenario	a),	indicating	the	untapped	potential	of	increased	building	efficiency.	In	
combination	 with	 continued	 diffusion	 of	 renewables,	 this	 could	 lead	 to	 a	 31%	 reduction	 of	 total	
emission	levels,	although	absolute	heat	demand	would	still	be	18%	larger	than	in	2014.	Compared	to	
baseline,	increased	thermal	efficiency	of	new	houses	would	reduce	cumulative	total	CO2	emissions	by	
9GtCO2.	
In	scenario	c,	we	assume	that	all	houses	converge	to	an	average	heating	 intensity	of	45kJ/m2/HDD	
until	2050,	which	implies	that	a	large	fraction	of	existing	buildings	would	be	retrofitted	with	improved	
insulation.	As	can	be	seen	in	Figure	2,	this	would	foremost	lead	to	additional	demand	reductions	in	
North	America,	Europe	and	the	Former	Soviet	Union	(by	15-20%	in	2050,	relative	to	demand	in	SSP2-
1.9).	Total	global	heat	demand	by	2050	would	be	9%	lower	than	in	2014,	leading	to	projected	additional	
reductions	of	direct	emission	of	a	similar	magnitude	(compared	to	scenario	b).	
Other	than	for	scenarios	b	and	c,	the	resulting	impacts	of	technology	policies	in	scenarios	d-j	are	not	
imposed	by	assumption	(e.g.,	by	assuming	stricter	building	codes),	but	are	subject	to	the	simulated	
decision-making	 by	 households.	 The	 resulting	 technology	 transitions	 therefore	 depend	 on	 the	
behavioural	characteristics	of	simulated	decisions.	
In	 scenario	 d,	 an	 (increasing)	 carbon	 tax	 of	 50-200€/tCO2	 is	 introduced	 in	 2020.	 Due	 to	 bounded	
rationality	and	limited	information	on	part	of	households,	the	projected	changes	in	technology	uptake	
would	only	unfold	very	gradually,	showing	considerable	inertia:	households	would	still	install	new	oil	
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systems	 until	 2035,	 and	 new	 gas	 systems	 even	 up	 to	 2050.	 As	 households	 learn	 about	 the	 new	
technologies,	and	industry	capacities	expand,	renewables	would	increasingly	grow	in	market	shares.	
Compared	to	scenario	c,	annual	heat	generation	in	2050	by	heat	pumps	would	be	90%	larger,	solar	
thermal	by	18%,	and	modern	biomass	by	50%	(reaching	a	combined	market	share	of	45p.p.	by	2050).	
The	resulting	decrease	in	annual	total	emissions	would	be	77%	in	2050	
In	scenario	e,	an	(increasing)	carbon	tax	of	100-400€/tCO2	is	projected	to	bring	down	direct	emissions	
by	95%,	and	total	emissions	by	84%.	Relative	to	the	lower	carbon	price	in	scenario	d,	the	2050	market	
shares	of	heat	pumps	and	modern	biomass	would	increase	by	+13%	and	+11%,	while	shares	of	solar	
remain	virtually	unaffected.	This	indicates	a	decreasing	marginal	impact	of	carbon	taxes	on	household	
decisions:	although	moderate	 tax	 levels	 can	be	 sufficient	 for	 slowly	 steering	household	 choices	 for	
regular	 replacements	and	new	 installations	away	 from	 fossil	 fuel	 technologies,	 slow	 turnover	 rates	
limit	the	resulting	pace	of	change	 in	the	technology	composition.	Furthermore,	households	tend	to	
discount	future	fuel	savings	which	can	be	achieved	by	adopting	highly	efficient,	but	capital-intensive	
modern	renewables.	Such	technologies	are	disadvantaged	by	their	higher	upfront	costs,	which	have	a	
more	 than	 proportional	 impact	 on	 households’	 decision-making.	 Instead,	 the	 carbon	 price	 would	
induce	a	shift	 towards	 (less	efficient)	direct	electric	heating	 (which	would	grow	by	30%,	 relative	 to	
scenario	d),	resulting	in	indirect	emission	increases.	
Subsidy	 schemes	 are	 simulated	 in	 scenarios	 f	 and	 g.	 The	 projected	 decrease	 in	 annual	 total	 CO2	
emissions	by	2050	is	49%	for	a	25%	subsidy,	and	62%	for	a	50%	subsidy.	Results	suggest	a	clear	shift	of	
household	 choices	 towards	more	 capital-intensive	and	efficient	 technologies,	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	
carbon	tax:	solar	thermal	and	ground-source	heat	pumps	show	the	largest	increases	in	uptake	(up	to	
+100%	and	+200%	relative	to	scenario	c,	respectively).	Accordingly,	electricity	use	for	heating	is	around	
50%	lower	than	in	the	carbon	tax	scenarios,	making	the	technology	portfolio	much	more	robust	against	
potential	indirect	emission	increases	in	the	power	sector.	Still,	results	suggest	that	on	their	own,	even	
large	subsidies	could	not	motivate	many	households	to	replace	functioning	systems	prematurely.	Even	
if	 ‘scrapping’	 would	 look	 beneficial	 from	 an	 outside	 perspective,	 households	 tend	 to	 apply	 strict	
behavioural	 payback	 criteria	 for	 such	 decisions,	 which	 makes	 ‘scrapping’	 unattractive	 from	 their	
subjective	perspectives	(see	section	3.2.3).		
In	scenario	h,	the	50%	subsidy	on	renewables	is	combined	with	the	50-200€/tCO2	carbon	tax.	From	a	
behavioural	perspective,	the	policy	mix	impacts	households’	decision-making	like	‘carrot	and	stick’:	the	
tax	enacts	a	steadily	increasing	economic	pressure	on	households,	strong	enough	so	that	a	growing	
proportion	of	them	may	eventually	want	to	reconsider	their	preference	for	fossil	fuel	technologies.	In	
parallel,	the	subsidy	has	an	over-proportional	impact	on	costs	as	they	are	perceived	by	households,	in	
particular	in	case	of	premature	replacements	(see	Figure	5),	thereby	benefiting	modern	renewables.	
According	 to	 the	 model	 projections,	 the	 policy	 mix	 could	 thus	 induce	 a	 wave	 of	 premature	
replacements.	As	a	result,	annual	total	emissions	by	2050	would	be	reduced	by	85%.		
While	the	policy	mix	of	scenario	h	is	projected	to	incentivise	a	decarbonisation	pathway	in	most	world	
regions,	results	suggest	that	the	policies	would	be	relatively	ineffective	in	the	Middle	East	and	Russia,	
where	 two-third	 of	 remaining	 emissions	 would	 occur	 by	 2050.	 In	 both	 regions,	 the	 diffusion	 of	
renewables	 is	 not	 just	 constrained	 by	 comparably	 low	 fossil	 fuel	 prices,	 but	 also	 by	 the	 practical	
absence	of	such	technologies	 in	the	present	technology	mix,	which	 implies	 limited	 local	knowledge	
and	 experience.	 Scenario	 i	 therefore	 adds	 ‘kick	 start’	 policies	 for	 driving	 the	 initial	 market	 for	
renewables	in	Russia	and	OPEC	states,	e.g.	in	form	of	procurement	schemes	(see	section	3.4).	Once	
households	and	local	industry	learn	about	the	new	technologies,	a	diffusion	process	is	nucleated,	and	
the	financial	incentives	can	have	a	much	larger	impact.	Overall,	the	policy	mix	is	projected	to	reduce	
total	emissions	by	90%	(direct	emissions	by	95%),	the	largest	total	reduction	in	all	scenarios.		
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Results	of	 scenarios	h	 and	 i	 imply	 that	mixing	policies	enables	 to	 impose	a	 lower	carbon	price	and	
reduce	costs	to	households	(see	section	4.3),	in	contrast	to	common	model	assumptions	in	which	all	
policies	are	assumed	to	have	a	‘carbon	price	equivalent’.	In	a	diffusion	model,	policy	interacts,	and	the	
behavioural	details	of	the	policy	mix	(and	how	it	impacts	household	decisions)	matters.	Compared	to	
a	carbon	price	on	its	own	(scenario	e),	our	results	suggest	that	the	transition	to	renewables	could	take	
place	with	more	efficient	(albeit	more	capital	intensive)	technologies:	although	leading	to	similar	direct	
emission	reductions,	the	carbon	tax	on	its	own	would	lead	to	much	higher	electricity	use,	leading	to	
larger	expenses	on	electricity	and	indirect	emission	increases	in	the	power	sector.			
In	all	scenarios,	an	increased	electrification	of	residential	heating	has	direct	implications	for	the	power	
sector.	Annual	electricity	demand	for	residential	heating	in	2014	was	around	1PWh/y	(or	4%	of	global	
electricity	 demand),	 causing	 indirect	 emissions	 of	 0,5GtCO2/y.	 In	 our	 baseline	 projection,	 it	 would	
increase	 to	2PWh/y	 in	2050.	Without	decarbonisation	of	 the	power	sector,	 indirect	emission	could	
then	reach	1,1GtCO2/y.	Net	reductions	in	cumulative	2015-2050	CO2	emissions	thus	strongly	depend	
on	a	parallel	decarbonisation	of	electricity	generation	(see	table	1).	Indirect	emission	increases	cancel	
out	5-20%	of	direct	emission	savings	when	assuming	a	rapid	power	sector	decarbonisation,	but	up	to	
55%	when	 the	 sector	 continues	 on	 its	 current	 trajectory.	 Net	 savings	 are	much	more	 sensitive	 to	
induced	power	sector	emissions	in	scenarios	which	only	rely	on	a	carbon	tax,	due	to	their	relatively	
higher	levels	of	electricity	demand.	Despite	this,	residential	emission	reductions	in	scenarios	c-i	would	
always	exceed	potential	emission	increases	in	the	power	sector.		
Table	2	Sensitivity	of	cumulative	2015-2050	direct	CO2	emissions	in	residential	heating,	with	regard	to:	(i)	future	energy	
price	developments	(relative	to	scenarios	with	constant	future	energy	prices),	assuming:	(a)	linear	increase	in	all	residential	
fuel	prices	by	+1%	per	year	(2018-2050),	(b)	linear	decrease	in	all	residential	fuel	prices	by	-1%	per	year	(2018-2050);	(II)	
learning	 rate	 for	 heating	 systems	 (50%	 lower	 than	 default	 assumption);	 (III)	 discount	 rate	 (50%	 higher	 than	 default	
assumption);	(IV)	‘intangible’	component	of	generalised	heating	cost	(50%	lower	than	default	estimates).	
%	deviation	of	cumulative	2015-2050	direct	CO2	emissions,	relative	to	default	parameters	
	 Increasing	fuel	prices		
(linear	by	+1%p.a.)	
Decreasing	fuel	prices		
(linear	by	-1%p.a.)	
Learning	rate	
(-50%)	
Discount	rate	
(+50%)	
Intangibles	
(-50%)	
a	 -4%	 +5%	 +3%	 +3%	 +7%	
b	 -3%	 +4%	 +2%	 +2%	 +7%	
c	 -3%	 +4%	 +2%	 +2%	 +7%	
d	 0%	 +1%	 +4%	 +2%	 +10%	
e	 +2%	 -1%	 +4%	 +1%	 +12%	
f	 -4%	 +6%	 +3%	 +2%	 +8%	
g	 -3%	 +7%	 +5%	 +1%	 +10%	
h	 0%	 0%	 +5%	 +1%	 +10%	
i	 -1%	 +1%	 +6%	 +1%	 +9%	
j	 +3%	 -2%	 +2%	 +1%	 +25%	
	
In	scenario	j,	we	explore	the	extreme	case	of	complete	electrification.	In	addition	to	the	100-400€/tCO2	
carbon	tax	from	scenario	e,	we	assume	that	electricity	use	for	heating	is	subsidised	by	0,05€/kWh,	and	
the	purchase	of	all	electricity-based	systems	by	30%.	Because	electric	heaters	are	a	readily	available	
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and	well-known	technology	in	most	world	regions,	also	being	clean	and	convenient	in	use,	our	model	
suggests	a	relatively	rapid	uptake	once	costs	are	favourable:	direct	electric	heating	alone	would	gain	a	
75%	 market	 share	 by	 2050,	 reducing	 on-site	 emissions	 by	 as	 much	 as	 99%.	 However,	 resulting	
electricity	demand	would	reach	9PWh/y,	requiring	2.000-2.400GW	of	additional	generation	capacity	
(almost	half	 of	 the	 currently	 installed	global	 capacity).	 Indirect	 emissions	would	 cancel	out	80%	of	
direct	 CO2	 reductions	 even	 under	 power	 sector	 decarbonisation,	 and	 could	 reach	 up	 to	 6GtCO2/y	
otherwise.	 This	 makes	 a	 direct	 electrification	 of	 heating	 an	 overall	 rather	 ineffective	 (or	 even	
counterproductive)	 mitigation	 strategy,	 particularly	 given	 the	 availability	 of	 much	 more	 efficient	
alternatives.	
Table	 2	 presents	 the	 sensitivity	 of	 our	 scenario	 results	 with	 respect	 to	 key	 parameters	 (for	 the	
sensitivity	with	respect	to	‘scrapping’	assumptions,	see	section	4.2).	It	becomes	evident	that	results	
are	relatively	robust	to	changes	in	cost	parameters:	under	alternative	assumptions	on	fuel	price	trends,	
learning	rates	and	discount	rates,	cumulative	direct	CO2	emissions	do	not	change	by	more	than	7%	in	
any	scenario.	The	largest	deviations	can	be	seen	for	changes	in	‘intangible’	cost	components:	if	they	
are	reduced	by	50%,	cumulative	emissions	are	up	to	12%	higher	(even	25%	in	case	of	the	complete	
electrification	scenario,	because	electric	heating	would	become	less	attractive).	This	is	partly	due	to	
the	fact	that	large	‘intangible’	costs	are	attributed	to	coal,	the	reduction	of	which	would	lead	to	the	
uptake	of	emission-intensive	coal	heating	systems.		
4.3 Cost-effectiveness	of	policy	mixes	
From	 a	 public	 policy	 perspective,	 the	 decarbonisation	 of	 heating	 could	 not	 only	 be	 beneficial	 for	
climate	change	mitigation,	but	potentially	also	enable	a	more	efficient	provision	of	heat	in	monetary	
terms.	 The	 cumulative	 projected	 costs	 and	 savings	 from	 the	 induced	 technology	 transitions	 (in	
scenarios	d-j)	are	presented	in	table	3,	relative	to	scenario	c	(with	improved	insulation,	but	without	
technology	policies).	Figure	4	exemplarily	shows	the	underlying	changes	over	time	per	world	region	in	
case	of	four	scenarios.		
Table	3	Cumulative	changes	in	global	expenses	on	residential	heating	(billion	Euro,	bn€),	for	policy	scenarios	d-j	(aiming	
at	uptake	of	low-carbon	technologies),	relative	to	scenario	c	(improved	insulation	and	retrofitting,	without	technology	
policies).	Monetary	values	are	shown	in	constant	2015-Euros	(undiscounted).	Changes	in	expenses	on	heating	systems	
per	tCO2	refer	to	net	reductions	in	CO2	emissions	(direct	plus	indirect	from	electricity	use).	
	 Scenario	 Expenses	on	heating	systems	
Expenses	on	
energy	for	
heating	
Total		
expenses	on	
heating	
Policy		
revenue	(Tax	
minus	subsidy)	
	 	 bn€(‘15)	 €(‘15)/tCO2	 bn€(‘15)	 bn€(‘15)	 bn€(‘15)	
	 c	 4.600	 ---	 16.030	 20.630	 ---	
Diff.	to	(c),	
in	bn€(‘15)	
d	 +460(+10%)	 36	 -1.010(-6%)	 -550(-3%)	 2.750	
e	 +770(+17%)	 44	 -830(-5%)	 -60(-0%)	 3.730	
f	 +460(+10%)	 121	 -1.160(-7%)	 -700(-3%)	 -400	
g	 +1.170(+25%)	 132	 -2.600(-16%)	 -1.430(-7%)	 -1.220	
h	 +1.540(+33%)	 82	 -3.190(-20%)	 -1.650(-8%)	 590	
i	 +1.650(+36%)	 80	 -3.400(-21%)	 -1.750(-8%)	 240	
j	 +1.640(+36%)	 284	 +3.080(+19%)	 +4.720(+23%)	 -10.800	
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In	all	scenarios,	cumulative	expenses	on	heating	systems	are	projected	to	increase	between	10-36%.	
Subsidies	would	lead	to	relatively	larger	increases	(compared	to	carbon	taxes)	in	terms	of	€/tCO2	net	
reduction,	as	they	incentivise	the	purchase	of	more	capital-intensive	technologies.	At	the	same	time,	
the	new	technologies	are	much	more	energy-efficient,	thus	enabling	substantial	reductions	in	energy	
expenses	for	heating,	which	range	between	5-21%.	As	for	expenses	on	heating	systems,	policy	mixes	
which	 involve	 subsidies	 are	 also	 projected	 to	 result	 in	 larger	 energy	 savings,	 as	 they	 lead	 to	 the	
adoption	of	more	energy-efficient	technology	portfolios.	
	
Figure	4	Changes	 in	expenses	on	residential	heating	(in	%)	per	world	region,	 for	exemplary	policy	scenarios	(aiming	at	
uptake	 of	 low-carbon	 technologies),	 relative	 to	 scenario	 c	 (improved	 insulation	 and	 retrofitting,	 without	 technology	
policies).	Monetary	values	show	the	cumulative	global	changes	in	each	panel	(in	constant	2015-Euros),	summed	over	2020-
2050.	
In	all	scenarios,	projected	savings	from	energy	expenses	exceed	the	additional	costs	for	the	purchase	
of	new	heating	systems	(assuming	constant	energy	prices),	leading	to	reductions	in	overall	expenses	
on	 heating	 by	 up	 to	 8%.	 The	 notable	 exemption	 is	 scenario	 j,	 in	 case	 of	 which	 the	 transition	 to	
(relatively	inefficient)	electric	resistance	heating	would	increase	overall	expenses	by	more	than	20%.	
Projected	net	 savings	are	 largest	 for	policy	mixes	which	 involve	both	 taxes	and	subsidies	 (h	 and	 i).	
While	they	show	the	largest	increases	in	expenses	on	heating	systems,	those	would	also	enable	the	
largest	energy	savings	and	emission	reductions.	
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Households,	however,	do	not	directly	 face	 the	changes	 in	net	 costs.	They	also	need	 to	pay	 for	 the	
carbon	taxes,	while	potentially	benefiting	from	purchase	subsidies.	When	taxes	are	used	as	the	only	
policy	instrument,	tax	payments	would	by	far	exceed	the	achievable	savings	in	real	costs.	Net	benefits	
for	households	would	then	depend	on	the	way	in	which	tax	revenues	are	redistributed.	In	case	of	policy	
mixes,	part	of	the	tax	revenues	would	be	recycled	into	purchase	subsidies.	Savings	in	real	costs	would	
then	exceed	the	net	burden	from	policies	to	households	(tax	payments	minus	subsidy	payments)	by	a	
factor	of	3-7.	
Importantly,	costs	and	savings	would	not	occur	simultaneously	(see	figure	4).	In	most	world	regions,	
additional	expenses	on	heating	systems	would	peak	around	2030.	Meanwhile,	 resulting	changes	 in	
energy	expenses	only	gradually	increase	over	time,	not	reaching	their	full	extent	before	2050.	In	most	
world	regions,	substantial	net	savings	are	thus	not	projected	before	2040.	This	type	of	temporal	trade-
off	 implies	 that	 while	 overall	 net	 savings	 may	 be	 large	 from	 a	 public	 policy	 perspective,	 specific	
technology	choices	may	still	remain	unattractive	from	the	perspective	of	individual	households	(which	
tend	to	discount	future	savings),	if	they	are	not	incentivised	by	policies.	
Furthermore,	costs	and	savings	are	not	equally	distributed	between	world	regions.	While	most	regions	
show	a	similar	profile	of	relative	changes	in	expenses	over	time,	some	regions	are	projected	to	realise	
much	larger	net	savings	(e.g.,	in	China),	while	others	could	face	net	cost	increases	for	longer	periods	
of	 time	 (e.g.,	 in	North	America).	The	 largest	 relative	cost	 increases	could	occur	 in	Russia	and	Nord	
Africa/Middle	East,	where	current	fossil	fuel	prices	are	considerably	lower	than	in	other	world	regions.	
The	 addition	 of	 ‘kick	 start’	 policies	 for	 those	 regions,	 however,	 is	 projected	 to	 reduce	 those	 cost	
increases	considerably,	as	it	would	incentivise	the	diffusion	of	more	efficient	alternative	technologies.	
4.4 Dynamics	in	an	exemplary	decarbonisation	scenario	
We	here	analyse	the	dynamics	of	decarbonising	residential	heating,	focusing	on	scenario	i.	The	cost	
dynamics	underlying	the	technology	transition	are	illustrated	in	Figure	5,	and	the	resulting	impacts	on	
technological	change	in	Figure	6,	under	different	assumption	regarding	household	behaviour.	
	
Figure	 5	 Technology	 cost	 dynamics	 in	 case	 of	 decarbonisation	 policy	 scenario	 i.	 Left:	 generalised	 cost	 of	 heating	 per	
technology,	 incl.	policies,	which	are	the	basis	of	regular	replacement	decisions	by	households.	Right:	marginal	running	
costs	 of	 fossil	 fuel	 systems	 compared	 to	 payback	 based	 costs	 of	 renewables	 (for	 a	 three-year	 payback	 period),	 the	
comparison	of	which	forms	the	basis	for	modelled	‘scrapping’	decisions.		
The	left	panel	of	Figure	5	shows	global	averages	for	the	generalised	cost	per	technology	as	seen	by	
households,	 including	 policies	 and	 ‘intangibles’.	 Without	 new	 policies	 and	 at	 current	 prices,	 heat	
pumps	 are	 not	 yet	 competitive	 with	 gas	 heating,	 but	 on	 par	 with	 oil.	 Solar	 thermal	 is	 already	
competitive	on	average,	which	mainly	reflects	 low	costs	 in	China,	where	66%	of	the	global	capacity	
Cost dynamics in a policy decarbonisation scenario (i)€/kWh €/kWh
0.06
0.10
0.14
Cost comparison for regular replacements:
Generalised cost of heating (GCOH)
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
2020 2030 2040 2020 2030 2040 2050
Cost comparison for ‘scrapping’:
Marginal costs of fossil-fuel technologies (solid lines) 
vs. payback-based costs of renewables (dashed lines)
CoalOil (condensing) Gas (condensing) Wood (boiler) HP (Ground) HP (Air-Water) Solar Thermal
	 22	
was	installed	in	2014.	Biomass	is	competitive	with	fossil	fuels	in	most	world	regions,	but	uptake	is	often	
less	 influenced	 by	 prices	 than	 by	 households’	 preferences,	 which	 tend	 to	 regard	 biomass	 as	 less	
convenient.	When	 introducing	new	policies	 in	2020,	 the	carbon	tax	 increases	 the	cost	of	 fossil	 fuel	
heating,	while	 subsidies	 decrease	 the	 cost	 of	 renewables,	making	 them	 competitive	with	 gas.	 The	
gradual	phase-out	of	 subsidies	after	2030	 is	 largely	 compensated	by	 learning-induced	decreases	 in	
investment	costs,	keeping	levelised	costs	of	renewables	relatively	stable	until	2050.	Induced	by	large	
capacity	increases,	investment	costs	for	solar	thermal	and	ground-source	heat	pumps	are	projected	to	
decrease	by	-20%	and	-45%	until	2030	(relative	to	2014),	respectively,	with	further	reductions	until	
2050	(overall	-30%	and	-66%,	respectively).	For	comparison:	the	IEA	(2016b)	expects	the	costs	of	solar	
thermal	to	decrease	by	around	-40%	until	2030.		
The	right	panel	shows	the	marginal	running	costs	of	fossil	fuel	heating,	compared	to	full	payback	costs	
for	renewable	technologies	(assuming	a	payback	period	of	three	years).	Choice	experiments	on	the	
behavioural	decision-making	of	households	indicate	that	as	long	as	the	former	do	not	exceed	the	latter,	
households	would	not	consider	a	premature	replacement,	even	if	it	would	be	highly	profitable	from	
an	outside	perspective	(Newell	and	Siikamäki,	2015;	Olsthoorn	et	al.,	2017).	The	combined	effect	of	
the	50-200€/tCO2	fuel	and	50%	subsidy	on	renewables	 is	 just	 large	enough	(despite	translating	 into	
much	 larger	differences	 in	 levelised	costs):	after	2020,	 the	 fuel	savings	 from	replacing	an	oil	or	gas	
system	 by	 renewables	 increasingly	 exceeds	 the	 necessary	 investment	 in	 less	 than	 three	 years,	
potentially	incentivizing	the	scrapping	of	fossil	fuel	capacities	before	they	reach	the	end	of	their	rated	
technological	lifetime.	
	
Figure	 6	 Replacement	 dynamics	 of	 global	 heating	 capacity	 under	 different	 behavioural	 assumptions	 on	 the	 average	
payback	threshold	for	premature	replacements:	15	years	(SD=5y),	3	years	(SD=1y),	and	1	year	(SD=1/3y).	Panels	show	the	
stock	of	global	heating	capacity	(left),	heating	capacity	which	is	built	within	each	year	(centre),	and	heating	capacity	which	
is	scrapped	prematurely	within	each	year	(right).	Horizontal	dashed	lines	represent	2014	levels,	vertical	dashed	lines	the	
introduction	of	simulated	policies	in	2020.		
The	resulting	dynamics	in	technological	change	can	be	seen	in	Figure	6,	which	shows	projections	for	
the	 total	 global	 heating	 capacity,	 capacity	 built	 per	 year,	 and	 capacity	 scrapped	 per	 year,	 under	
different	behavioural	assumptions.	Under	the	modelled	mean	payback	threshold	of	3	years	(middle	
panels),	scrapping	happens	rarely	before	2020:	less	than	20GW	(0,3%)	of	the	global	capacity	would	be	
replaced	 prematurely	 each	 year,	 while	 total	 capacity	 additions	 are	 around	 400GW/y	 (6,6%).	 After	
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2020,	scrapping	would	gradually	increase,	peaking	at	115GW/y	(around	1,8%)	in	the	2030s.	While	small	
on	an	annual	basis,	the	model	suggests	that	households	would	scrap	a	total	capacity	of	2.700GW	from	
2020-50,	 which	 is	 around	 45%	 of	 the	 installed	 capacity	 in	 2020.	 The	 induced	 dynamics	 are	 self-
reinforcing,	 allowing	 a	 faster	 growth	 of	 households’	 experience	 and	 industry	 know-how	 regarding	
renewable	heating	technologies,	and	eventually	an	almost	complete	phase-out	of	fossil	fuel	systems	
by	2050.	
The	importance	of	household	behaviour	and	related	uncertainty	becomes	evident	in	comparison	with	
the	 upper	 and	 lower	 panels	 of	 Figure	 6,	 which	 depict	 the	 same	 dynamics	 for	 hypothetical	 mean	
payback	thresholds	of	15	years	and	1	year.	Applying	a	threshold	of	15	years	is	equivalent	to	a	discount	
rate	 of	 3%	 (given	 a	 technical	 life	 expectancy	of	 20	 years),	 implying	 the	optimistic	 assumption	 that	
household	decisions	 take	 into	account	potential	 future	 savings	 to	almost	 full	 extent.	 If	 households	
were	indeed	acting	in	that	way,	the	model	suggests	that	they	should	scrap	around	130GW/y	(2,4%)	
even	 before	 policies	 get	 introduced	 in	 2020,	 and	 up	 to	 200GW/y	 (3,6%)	 immediately	 afterwards.	
Households	would	also	favour	more	capital-intensive	technologies,	as	evidenced	by	the	rapid	uptake	
of	 solar	 thermal	 and	 ground-source	 heat	 pumps.	 In	 a	 world	 of	 such	 forward-looking	 households,	
heating	could	be	largely	decarbonised	by	2035,	around	15	years	earlier	than	in	scenario	i.	
The	opposite	result	is	projected	if	households	were	to	apply	an	average	payback	threshold	of	1	year.	
In	this	case,	they	would	only	replace	their	heating	system	once	expected	savings	exceed	the	upfront	
cost	within	one	year.	Scrapping	would	then	be	virtually	non-existent	before	2020	(8GW/y),	and	not	
exceed	50GW/y	(0,8%)	in	the	2030s.	While	renewables	could	still	grow	to	service	additional	demand	
(such	as	in	China),	the	decarbonisation	of	the	existing	building	stock	would	largely	depend	on	regular	
replacements.	Given	average	technical	lifetime	of	20	years	and	the	implemented	model	assumptions	
on	diffusion	dynamics	(in	which	growth	is	correlated	to	current	market	shares),	our	projections	suggest	
that	a	complete	transition	is	then	not	achievable	until	2050,	at	least	not	under	the	simulated	policies:	
fossil	fuel	capacities	in	2050	would	remain	at	40%	of	their	current	level.	
5 Discussion	and	Conclusion	
Our	results	suggest	that	an	almost-complete	decarbonisation	of	residential	heating	 is	possible	until	
2050,	based	on	a	combination	of	improved	building	insulation	and	existing	technologies,	but	unlikely	
to	happen	without	stringent	policy	instruments.	Policy	mixes	are	projected	to	be	more	effective	than	
a	carbon	tax	on	its	own	for	driving	the	market	of	low-carbon	technologies,	involving	lower	cumulative	
net	 emissions	 and	 reduced	 cost	 burdens	 for	 households.	 From	 a	 societal	 perspective,	 emission	
reductions	may	be	achieved	at	low	or	even	negative	cost:	initially	higher	capital	expenses	could	lead	
to	permanently	decreased	energy	expenses	in	most	world	regions.	
The	simulated	technology	transitions	in	residential	heating	would	need	decades	rather	than	years,	in	
parts	simply	due	to	long	average	lifetimes	of	heating	equipment.	Given	such	time-scales,	our	model	
projections	suggest	that	a	complete	decarbonisation	until	2050	does	not	only	require	an	immediate	
ramp-up	of	low-carbon	investments,	but	also	that	households	replace	(or	‘scrap’)	a	substantial	share	
of	 inefficient	 heating	 systems	 prematurely.	 Therefore,	 the	 simulated	 effectiveness	 of	 policies	
inevitably	depends	on	behavioural	assumptions	on	‘scrapping’	decisions.		
Overall,	there	remains	a	considerable	degree	of	uncertainty	regarding	behaviour,	data	and	the	future	
development	of	technology	characteristics,	under	which	the	true	long-term	effect	of	any	policy	is	hard	
to	estimate	a	priori.	Representing	all	relevant	behavioural	factors	in	a	quantitative	global	energy	model	
may	 remain	 an	 unachievable	 benchmark,	 given	 that	 no	 model	 can	 ever	 be	 more	 than	 a	 stylised	
representation	of	reality.	We	thus	chose	a	midway	compromise,	integrating	in	a	stylised	form	available	
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knowledge	on	technology	diffusion	and	household	decision-making	into	a	bottom-up	simulation	model	
of	technology	choice.	While	it	remains	limited	in	its	degree	of	realism,	we	argue	that	it	provides	a	clear	
improvement	on	incumbent	optimisation	models,	shedding	light	on	important	diffusion	dynamics	and	
behavioural	uncertainties.	
Our	 results	 show	 that	 such	 uncertainties	 are	 particularly	 relevant	 in	 the	 context	 of	 limiting	 global	
warming	to	1.5°C,	which	requires	policies	aiming	at	rapid	deep	decarbonisation,	and	are	outside	of	
what	has	so	 far	been	 implemented	 in	most	parts	of	 the	world.	Due	to	our	 inclusion	of	behavioural	
features,	 however,	 our	 projections	 are	potentially	more	 valuable	 to	policy-makers	 for	 carrying	out	
impact	assessments	of	possible	sets	of	policies,	in	comparison	to	standard	optimization	models	that	
assume	perfect	information	and	rationality.	Due	to	their	use	of	unrealistic	behavioural	assumptions,	
the	latter	could	potentially	mislead	policy-makers	towards	excessively	simplistic	policy	strategies	for	
incentivising	the	decarbonisation	of	households.		
Other	 aspects	 of	 household	 decision-making	 are	 likely	 relevant,	 but	 still	 remain	 unspecified	 in	 our	
modelling	 -	 such	as	 split	 incentives	 (e.g.	 in	 case	of	 rented	property),	or	a	 limited	access	 to	 finance	
(which	is	one	possible	reason	explaining	low	required	payback	times).	The	value	of	‘intangibles’,	which	
we	 estimate	 from	 historical	 diffusion	 trends,	 are	 not	 necessarily	 constant	 over	 decades,	 but	 may	
change	over	time.	Some	behavioural	uncertainties	remain	impossible	to	simulate,	so	that	our	results	
may	still	be	considered	as	optimistic.	
While	our	modelling	achieves	 the	 target	with	our	 set	of	 assumed	behavioural	 features,	 it	 can	only	
indicate	 the	 potential	 of	 behaviourally-oriented	 policies.	 Much	 remains	 unknown	 on	 how	 to	
specifically	 design	 and	 implement	 such	 policies,	which	must	 take	 into	 account	 as	much	 additional	
behavioural	knowledge	as	possible,	and	can	benefit	substantially	from	psychological	and	sociological	
research.	While	the	evidence	base	remains	relatively	thin,	there	is	little	time	to	spare,	and	therefore	
further	research	in	the	direction	of	behavioural	science	and	modelling	will	need	to	be	carried	out	in	
conjunction	to	the	introduction	of	policies.	 	
	 25	
	
6 Appendix	
6.1 Tables	
	
Appendix-Table	1	Grouping	of	the	59	E3ME	regions	(right)	into	eleven	major	world	regions	(left)	(aggregation	is	only	for	
presentation	of	results,	FTT:Heat	simulates	all	59	regions	individually).	
Western	Europe	
Belgium,	Denmark,	Germany,	Greece,	Spain,	France,	Ireland,	Italy,	Luxembourg,	
Netherlands,	Austria,	Portugal,	Finland,	Sweden,	UK,	Cyprus,	Malta,	Norway,	
Switzerland,	Iceland,	Turkey	
Central	and	Eastern	Europe	 Czech	Republic,	Estonia,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	Hungary,	Poland,	Slovenia,	Slovakia,	Bulgaria,	Romania,	Croatia,	Macedonia	
North	America	 USA,	Canada	
Latin	America	 Mexico,	Brazil,	Argentina,	Colombia,	Rest	of	Latin	America	
Former	Soviet	Union	 Russia,	Belarus,	Ukraine	
China	 China	
South	and	Pacific	Asia	 Indonesia,	Rest	of	ASEAN,	India,	Korea,	Taiwan	
Oceania	(Pacific	OECD)	 Australia,	New	Zealand,	Japan	
North	Africa	and	Middle	East	 Saudi	Arabia,	OPEC	excl.	Venezuela,	Africa	OPEC	
Sub-Saharan	Africa	 Nigeria,	South	Africa,	Rest	of	Africa	
Rest	of	World	 Rest	of	World	(all	other	countries)	
	
	
6.2 Estimation	of	intangible	cost	components	
The	 technology-	 and	 region-specific	 empirical	 parameter	 𝛾? 	 is	 estimated	 in	 a	 two-step	 calibration	
procedure	(shown	in	Appendix-Figure	1):	first,	we	run	the	model	based	on	the	cost	estimates	of	LCOHi	
only,	with	𝛾?=0	for	all	technologies.	For	each	region,	we	then	compare	the	growth	of	technologies	as	
projected	by	the	model	with	the	diffusion	trend	as	observable	in	the	historic	data,	using	a	graphical	
interface.	If	there	are	deviations,	we	iteratively	adjust	the	values	of	𝛾? 	(upwards	or	downwards),	until	
the	 projected	 diffusion	 at	 the	 start	 of	 the	 simulation	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 empirical	 trends.	 The	
estimated	values	of	‘intangibles’	are	assumed	to	be	constant	over	the	simulation	period,	since	we	have	
no	possibility	to	estimate	future	preferences.	
On	 average,	 we	 find	 that	 oil,	 gas	 (incl.	 LPG)	 and	 district	 heating	 are	 slightly	 more	 attractive	 to	
households	than	suggested	by	the	pure	costs,	leading	to	values	of		𝛾? 	 in	the	range	of	-10%	to	-15%,	
relative	to	the	pure	LCOHi.	For	electric	resistance	heating,	the	average	𝛾? 	is	equivalent	to	-30%	of	its	
LCOHi.	The	opposite	holds	for	coal	and	biomass	heating,	for	which	typical	𝛾? 	values	are	between	+40%	
and	+80%.	For	solar	thermal	and	heat	pumps,	values	differ	by	region,	usually	between	-20%	and	+20%.	
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Appendix-Figure	1	Estimation	of	‘intangible’	cost	components	with	FTT:Heat,	at	the	example	of	Japan.	(i)	shows	the	historic	
(2008-2014)	and	projected	trends	in	technology	shares	(2015-2022)	without	‘intangibles’,	(ii)	shows	the	graphical	interface	
for	adjusting	the	values	of	 ‘intangibles’,	(iii)	shows	the	resulting	trends	in	technology	shares	with	the	‘intangibles’.	The	
dashed	vertical	lines	indicate	the	start	of	the	model	simulation.	
	
6.3 Detailed	technology	data	
Appendix-Table	2	Model	assumptions	for	residential	heating	technologies.	Costs	refer	to	mean	values.	(Data	sources:	
Fleiter	et	al.	(2016),	IEA/ETSAP	(2012),	Danish	Energy	Agency	(2013),	EHPA	(2016)).	
	 Upfront	cost		
(€/kWth)	
O&M	cost	
(€/kWth	pa)	
Efficiency	
(kWhth/kWh)	
Learning	rate	
(%)	
	
Oil		 471	 19	 0.75	 ---	 	
Oil	condensing		 512	 20	 0.86	 -10%	 	
Gas		 391	 8	 0.75	 ---	 	
Gas	condensing	 434	 9	 0.9	 -10%	 	
Biomass	stove	 440	 0.1	 0.1-0.7	 ---	 	
Biomass	boiler	 523	 2	 0.85	 -10%	 	
Coal		 247	 5	 0.75	 ---	 	
District	heating	 265	 16	 0.98	 ---	 	
Direct	electric	 538	 0.5	 1.00	 ---	 	
HP-	ground	source	 1400	 14	 3.50	 -30%	
	HP-	air/water	 750	 15	 2.50-2.70	 -30%	
HP-	air/air	 510	 51	 2.50-2.70	 -30%	
Solar	thermal	 773	 8	 ---	 -10%	 	
	
Conversion	efficiencies	refer	to	the	ratio	of	thermal	energy	‘leaving’	the	heating	system,	relative	to	
the	necessary	energy	input,	covering	both	space	and	water	heating.	In	case	of	traditional	biomass,	
lower	conversion	efficiencies	(10-50%)	are	assumed	in	developing	countries	(IEA,	2014).	For	heat	
pumps,	efficiency	values	are	defined	as	their	seasonal	performance	factor	(the	annual	average	ratio	
of	delivered	heat	to	electricity	input),	which	differs	by	climate	region.	For	solar	thermal,	local	
productivities	are	calculated	from	data	by	the	IEA	Solar	Heat	Programme	(Mauthner	et	al.,	2016),	
which	we	integrate	into	the	model	as	region-specific	capacity	factors	(i.e.,	units	of	heat	produced	per	
unit	of	capacity	installed).	The	average	technical	life	expectancy	is	set	to	20	years	for	all	technologies,	
based	on	literature	estimates	(the	actual	lifetime	may	be	shorter	if	households	decide	to	replace	a	
system	earlier	for	economic	reasons)	(Danish	Energy	Agency,	2016;	IEA/ETSAP,	2012).	
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Appendix-Table	3	Model	estimates	for	levelised	cost	of	heating	(LCOH),	generalised	cost	of	heating	(GCOH),	estimated	
values	of	intangible	cost	components,	and	standard	deviation	of	LCOH.	All	numbers	refer	to	mean	values,	calculated	as	
the	average	of	all	59	modelled	world	regions	(weighted	by	their	heat	demand).	
	 LCOH		 GCOH	 Estimated	values	of	
intangibles	
Standard	deviation	of	
LCOH	
	 €-Cent/kWhth	 €-Cent/kWhth	 €-Cent/kWhth	 	 %LCOH	 €-Cent/kWhth	 %LCOH	
Oil		 11,1	 9,7	 -1,3	 	 -12%	 0,02	 17%	
Oil	condensing		 10,2	 9,0	 -1,3	 	 -13%	 0,02	 17%	
Gas		 9,3	 8,0	 -1,2	 	 -13%	 0,02	 17%	
Gas	condensing	 8,2	 6,6	 -1,6	 	 -20%	 0,01	 18%	
Biomass	stove	 5,8	 5,1	 -0,7	 	 -11%	 0,02	 29%	
Biomass	boiler	 4,3	 5,9	 1,6	 	 37%	 0,01	 30%	
Coal		 3,0	 5,5	 2,5	 	 84%	 0,01	 27%	
District	heating	 7,2	 6,2	 -1,1	 	 -15%	 0,01	 16%	
Direct	electric	 11,8	 8,6	 -3,2	 	 -27%	 0,02	 14%	
HP-	ground		 9,3	 8,7	 -0,7	 	 -7%	
-8%	
-5%	
0,02	 25%	
HP-	air/water	 8,7	 8,0	 -0,7	 	 0,02	 21%	
HP-	air/air	 8,8	 8,4	 -0,4	 	 0,02	 19%	
Solar	thermal	 10,8	 10,0	 -0,8	 	 -8%	 0,04	 33%	
	
	
6.4 Regional	technology	pathways	in	scenario	i	
Appendix-figure	2	summarises	the	simulated	future	development	of	residential	heating	systems	in	five	
major	world	regions,	together	accounting	for	80%	of	heat	demand	and	direct	heating	CO2	emissions	in	
2014.	Technology	composition	and	emissions	by	region	are	shown	for	a	projection	under	 improved	
levels	of	building	 insulation	 (scenario	c)	on	 the	 left,	 and	under	additional	policies	 for	 technological	
decarbonisation	of	heating	(scenario	i)	on	the	right.	
In	 Western	 Europe	 and	 North	 America,	 heating	 is	 currently	 dominated	 by	 gas.	 Under	 baseline	
conditions,	their	technology	composition	would	stay	relatively	constant,	while	the	ongoing	diffusion	
of	more	efficient	gas	heating	systems	and	a	limited	uptake	of	renewables	implies	a	continued,	but	slow	
decrease	of	emissions.	Under	policies	 in	scenario	h,	fossil	 fuel	heating	and	direct	electric	heating	in	
both	regions	would	be	substituted	by	a	mix	of	heat	pumps	and	solar	thermal,	with	only	limited	diffusion	
of	modern	biomass.	
In	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	large	shares	of	the	heating	demand	are	currently	serviced	by	district	
heat	networks,	biomass	and	gas.	Most	direct	emissions,	however,	originate	in	a	relatively	large	share	
of	coal	heating,	compared	to	other	world	regions.	Modern	renewables	are	mostly	absent	under	current	
technology	diffusion	trends.	Under	decarbonisation	policies,	our	model	suggests	that	fossil	fuels	would	
be	 substituted	 by	 a	mix	 of	 biomass	 and	 heat	 pumps,	while	 the	 projected	 uptake	 of	 solar	 thermal	
remains	low.	
In	China,	fossil	fuels	still	play	a	smaller	role	in	heating.	Historically,	most	emissions	result	from	coal.	Oil	
and	gas	are	on	the	rise,	however,	and	would	continue	their	ongoing	growth	under	baseline	conditions.	
At	the	same	time,	a	widespread	uptake	of	solar	thermal	systems	and	heat	pumps	is	taking	place,	so	
that	baseline	emissions	are	projected	to	peak	around	2030	and	decrease	afterwards.	With	additional	
policies,	 the	 shift	 to	 renewables	would	be	accelerated,	with	 solar	 supplying	 the	equivalent	of	 two-
thirds	 of	 the	 water	 heating	 demand	 by	 2050.	 Importantly,	 China	 is	 also	 the	 region	 with	 largest	
projected	 demand	 increases	 until	 2050,	 driven	 by	 continuously	 rising	 incomes	 (and	 coming	 from	
historically	very	low	values	of	heating	intensity).	
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Appendix-Figure	2	Technology	composition	and	CO2	emissions	 (direct	on-site	and	 indirect	electricity	emissions)	 in	 the	
residential	heating	sector	in	five	world	regions,	under	current	technology	trends	with	improved	insulation	and	retrofitting	
(c)	 and	 a	 scenario	 with	 -95%	 global	 direct	 decarbonisation	 by	 2050	 (i).	Model	 simulations	 by	 FTT:Heat	 start	 in	 2015	
(indicated	by	vertical	dashed	lines).	Horizontal	dashed	lines	represent	2014	levels.	Solid	curves	show	the	baseline	demand	
trends	from	scenario	a,	and	dashed	curves	the	total	emissions	should	the	power	sector	not	be	decarbonised.	Percentage	
values	refer	to	the	change	by	2050,	relative	to	2014.	Bold	percentage	values	indicate	the	reduction	in	annual	total	CO2	
emissions	(direct	+	indirect),	the	values	in	brackets	show	the	corresponding	reduction	in	direct	on-site	CO2	emissions.	
In	the	Former	Soviet	Union,	60%	of	heat	is	currently	provided	by	district	heating	systems,	the	remaining	
fraction	by	gas	and	oil.	No	use	of	renewables	is	reported,	limiting	the	potential	for	a	fast	technology	
transition.	Therefore,	only	little	change	would	take	place	in	the	baseline,	with	slowly	rising	emission	
levels	until	2050.	With	decarbonisation	policies,	only	the	introduction	of	 ‘kick	start’	schemes	would	
eventually	lead	to	a	limited	uptake	of	renewables.	Most	emissions	occur	not	on	site,	but	in	centralized	
heat	plants.	A	parallel	decarbonisation	would	thus	need	to	take	place	in	the	country’s	district	heating	
systems,	which	are	not	explicitly	modelled	here	 (the	same	holds	 for	central	heating	 in	other	world	
regions).	
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